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The World Bank

Report No: ICR2614

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(IDA-31940)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 35.8 MILLION
(US$ 50.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT

FOR A

SECONDARY EDUCATION ENHANCEMENT PROJECT

June 14, 2013

Human Development Department
Djibouti, Egypt and Yemen Country Department
Middle East and North Africa Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective 2/6/2013)

Currency Unit = Egyptian Pound (EGP)
1.00 EGP = US$0.149
US$1.00 = 6.702 EGP

FISCAL YEAR
January 1 – December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CAPMAS	Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CCIMD	Center for Curriculum and Instructional Materials Development
DCA	Development Credit Agreement
EEP	Education Enhancement Program
EGP	Egyptian Pound
GAEB	General Association for Educational Buildings
ICR	Implementation Completion and Results Report
ICT	Information and communication technology
IDA	International Development Association
ISR	Implementation Status and Results Report
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MOE	Ministry of Education
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NAQAAE	National Authority for Quality Assurance and Accreditation of Education
NCEEE	National Center for Educational Evaluation and Examinations
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PDO	Project Development Objective
PIRLS	Progress in International Reading Literacy Study
PISA	Programme for International Student Assessment
PPMU	Project Planning and Monitoring Unit
PSR	Project Status Report
QAG	Quality Assurance Group
SEEP	Secondary Education Enhancement Project
TIMSS	Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study
TTL	Task Team Leader
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

Vice President: Inger Andersen
Country Director: Hartwig Schafer
Sector Manager: Mourad Ezzine
Project Team Leader: Ernesto Cuadra
ICR Team Leader: Ernesto Cuadra

EGYPT, ARAB REPUBLIC OF
Secondary Education Enhancement Project

CONTENTS

A. Basic Information			
Country:	Egypt, Arab Republic of	Project Name:	Secondary Education Enhancement Project
Project ID:	P050484	L/C/TF Number(s):	IDA-31940
ICR Date:	06/14/2013	ICR Type:	Core ICR
Lending Instrument:	SIL	Borrower:	GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT
Original Total Commitment:	XDR 35.80M	Disbursed Amount:	XDR 35.68M
Revised Amount:	XDR 35.80M		
Environmental Category: C			
Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Education (MOE)			
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:			

B. Key Dates				
Process	**Date**	**Process**	**Original Date**	**Revised / Actual Date(s)**
Concept Review:	07/06/1998	Effectiveness:	06/29/2000	06/29/2000
Appraisal:	02/13/1999	Restructuring(s):		06/29/2010 07/03/2012
Approval:	04/15/1999	Mid-term Review:		
		Closing:	06/30/2006	10/31/2012

C. Ratings Summary	
C.1 Performance Rating by ICR	
Outcomes:	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome:	High
Bank Performance:	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Borrower Performance:	Moderately Unsatisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)			
Bank	**Ratings**	**Borrower**	**Ratings**
Quality at Entry:	Unsatisfactory	Government:	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Quality of Supervision:	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Implementing Agency/Agencies:	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Overall Bank Performance:	Moderately Unsatisfactory	**Overall Borrower Performance:**	Moderately Unsatisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators			
Implementation Performance	**Indicators**	**QAG Assessments (if any)**	**Rating**
Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	No	Quality at Entry (QEA):	Satisfactory
Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	Yes	Quality of Supervision (QSA):	None
DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:	Moderately Satisfactory		

D. Sector and Theme Codes		
	Original	**Actual**
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Central government administration	5	5
Other social services	5	
Secondary education	80	80
Sub-national government administration	5	10
Tertiary education	5	5
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Education for all	33	40
Education for the knowledge economy	33	40
Other social development	17	
Participation and civic engagement	17	20

E. Bank Staff		
Positions	**At ICR**	**At Approval**
Vice President:	Inger Andersen	Kemal Dervis
Country Director:	Hartwig Schafer	Khalid Ikram
Sector Manager:	Mourad Ezzine	Jacques Baudouy
Project Team Leader:	Ernesto P. Cuadra	Mae Chu Chang
ICR Team Leader:	Ernesto P. Cuadra	
ICR Primary Author:	Michael T. Mertaugh	

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document**)**
To improve the quality and opportunity in secondary education by:

a. Increasing access to general secondary education through upgrading commercial schools to technological general schools and providing flexible options for study within and between branches of the system;

b. Better aligning curricula and assessment with the skills needs of employers and higher education;

c. Providing professional development for teachers and administrators on new technologies, curricula, assessment and management techniques; and

d. Strengthening institutional capacity.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

N.A.

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	Share of general secondary students increases from 30% to 50% by 2006			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	30%	50%	40%	43%
Date achieved	02/13/1999	04/16/1999	06/16/2010	06/28/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	The target value of the PDO was revised with no consultation to the Board			
Indicator 2 :	At least 70% of school management teams in project schools are judge competent in duties outlined in new job criteria by 2006			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	No performance measure was available at the time of preparation	70% of school management teams	At least 70% of school management teams in project schools are judge competent in duties outlined in new job criteria by 2012	70%
Date achieved	03/28/1998	04/16/1999	06/15/2010	06/30/2008
Comments (incl. % achievement)	The 70% value is based on information about training. No performance measurement criteria were developed.			

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	A core curriculum framework developed, including the curriculum for core subject areas			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	No curriculum framework exist	Core and elective curriculum and textbooks developed for general and technical education	A core curriculum framework developed including the curriculum for core subject areas	Curriculum framework approved
Date achieved	02/13/1999	04/16/1999	06/15/2010	04/27/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Several MoE teams began working on the development of new subject curriculum before finalizing the general curriculum framework.			
Indicator 2 :	School management responsibilities devolved to local levels			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	No school action plan exist	315 project schools produce and implement school improvement plans with participation of new Boards of Trustees.	Board of Trustees set up in all project schools	All project schools have Board of Trustees
Date achieved	02/13/1999	04/16/1999	06/15/2010	09/30/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Schools did participate in the preparation of action plans but the activity was not sustained systematically.			

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No.	Date ISR Archived	DO	IP	Actual Disbursements (USD millions)
1	05/06/1999	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.00
2	06/17/1999	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.00
3	07/02/1999	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.00
4	12/20/1999	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.00
5	06/21/2000	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.00
6	11/22/2000	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.00
7	04/30/2001	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.46
8	10/29/2001	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	1.51
9	04/26/2002	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	2.43

10	10/25/2002	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	7.21
11	04/18/2003	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	11.41
12	10/20/2003	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	13.05
13	05/01/2004	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	15.50
14	11/08/2004	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	16.99
15	04/26/2005	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	18.34
16	12/01/2005	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	19.57
17	06/16/2006	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	23.00
18	12/22/2006	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	25.66
19	06/26/2007	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	26.20
20	12/21/2007	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	27.52
21	06/30/2008	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	28.66
22	12/30/2008	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	29.94
23	07/04/2009	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	33.32
24	05/26/2010	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	40.23
25	02/20/2011	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	42.07
26	10/26/2011	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	44.04
27	06/23/2012	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	45.61

H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring Date(s)	Board Approved PDO Change	ISR Ratings at Restructuring		Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in USD millions	Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made
		DO	IP		
06/29/2010	N	MS	MS	40.23	To extend the Closing Date from June 30, 2010 to June 30, 2012; and to introduce minor changes to the PDOs and to add new intermediate indicators
07/03/2012		MS	MS	46.45	To extend the Closing Date from June 30, 2012 to October 31, 2012

I. Disbursement Profile



1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

(this section is descriptive, taken from other documents, e.g., PAD/ISR, not evaluative)

1.1 Context at Appraisal

(brief summary of country and sector background, rationale for Bank assistance)

Country and sector background. The 1997 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Egypt emphasized the key role of human capital in the country's economic development. It recommended a range of measures intended to stimulate the productive sectors of the economy by encouraging private industry, export-led growth, and investment in technology. But it noted that these actions would succeed only if Egypt develops a skilled, healthy, and competitive labor force.

Government spending on education had increased in the prior five years to a relatively high 6.5% of GDP. Despite this fiscal effort, education quality remained low and many graduates lacked the skills needed in the job market. Many secondary school graduates were unable to find work. Excessively centralized decision-making and other obstacles led to inefficiency in education delivery and misallocation of resources. The CAS cited a need to improve curricula and develop cognitive skills at the basic education level, but predicted that these would be politically and administratively difficult to implement.

Donor efforts in the education sector in Egypt focused principally on basic education, After a long period in which secondary education [1] in Egypt gave preference to (vocational) technical education over general education, the project supported a new strategy by the Government to improve equity by restoring balance to secondary education. Most students who wished to continue their education after the compulsory primary and preparatory cycles had been oriented to technical secondary schools – specialized either in industrial, commercial, or agricultural subjects. Most students in these programs entered the labor market upon completion; only 5% of them went on to higher education. Relatively few students were oriented to general secondary schools that provided most entrants to higher education. The Government's target under this policy was to enroll 70% of secondary students in (vocational) technical programs, with just 30% in general secondary schools. This vocational bias dated to the 1970s and continued with the support of donor agencies throughout the 1980s.[2] It was aided by government policies that limited entry to general secondary education, while at the same time facilitating the flow of students from general secondary education to higher education by a seven-fold increase in the budget for higher education between the first and fourth 5-year plans (1982 to 1998).[3]

Despite this vocational bias, technical education programs were not well aligned with the skill needs of employers. A major Government paper on technical and vocational education and training found that "*most technical education students entered the labor market directly after their studies, more often than not without completing their courses. Even those who did complete their courses had high unemployment rates, competing less successfully against an increasing number of university graduates going for the same*

type of work, as well as against semi-skilled workers trained mostly on the job."[4] This segmentation of secondary schooling was an important driver of unequal opportunity, as graduates of technical schools faced poor employment prospects upon completion while graduates of general secondary schools had better access to higher education and higher-level jobs.

The vocational bias in secondary education persisted until the late 1990s. At the time of project identification (1998), 66% of Egypt's secondary students were enrolled in technical schools.[5] Adult male workers in the labor force with technical secondary education outnumbered those with general secondary education by 2½ to one in urban areas; in rural areas, by more than five to one.[6] Under the Government's new policy and with the support of the Secondary Education Enhancement Project (SEEP), the Government aimed to achieve equality in technical secondary and general secondary enrollments by 2006.

The SEEP Project Appraisal Document (PAD) identified four main sector issues:

- imbalance between technical and general schooling, with too many secondary students (66% of total enrollments) enrolled in technical schools and too few in general schools leading to higher education,
- poor quality and relevance of education due to deficiencies of curricula and teacher training,
- inadequate quality assurance mechanisms to monitor school performance and student learning, with excessive reliance on rote memorization and too little on application of knowledge, and
- inefficiencies in service delivery, reflecting deficiencies in resource management and lack of incentives for improved performance.

As part of SEEP preparation, the Government developed and adopted a "Strategic Framework for Reform of Secondary Education."[7] This document set forth goals for making secondary education more equitable and responsive to labor-market needs, and established reform-program goals and related project output goals for each of several sub-categories under two main reform-program intervention areas: a) improving quality and opportunity, and b) strengthening institutional capacity. Major elements of that strategy involved increasing the share of secondary enrollments in general schools and reducing them in technical schools, and revising curricula and course options in order to provide more flexibility to students during and after their secondary studies. The SEEP supported implementation of the Secondary Education Reform Program through activities that addressed each of the sub-categories in the Government's Reform Program.

Rationale for Bank Involvement. The PAD description of "Value added of Bank support in this project,"[8] emphasized the Bank's role as a catalyst among other donors and its experience with system-wide reforms and public-private partnerships. More fundamentally, the rationale for Bank involvement in the project arose from: a) the expected public-good benefits of the supported interventions in terms of improved equity and productivity, and b) the fact that efforts of the Bank and other donors up to the time of project preparation had focused on levels of education other than secondary

education.[9] These efforts included an extensive USAID[10] program of support for improvements in basic education, as well as the World-Bank supported Education Enhancement Program (EEP). The EEP was approved in 1997 and was under implementation at the time of the SEEP identification and early implementation.[11] Earlier Bank-financed projects in the education sector were the 1985 Vocational Training Project, which trained technical staff for the electricity sector, and the 1993 Basic Education Improvement Project, which supported school construction, training, curriculum development and equipment for primary and preparatory education.

1.2 Original Project Development Objective (PDO) and Key Indicators (*as approved*)

Project Development Objective. As described on page 2 of the PAD, the SEEP's PDO was:

> *"to improve the quality and opportunity in secondary education by: a) increasing access to general secondary education through upgrading commercial schools to technical schools and providing flexible options for study within and between branches of the system, b) better aligning curricula and assessment with the skills needs of employers and higher education, c) providing professional development for teachers and administrators on new technologies, curricula, assessment and management techniques, and d) strengthening institutional capacity."*

The reference to "upgrading commercial schools to technical schools" in item a) of this statement is an obvious error.[1] It is inconsistent with the statements on page 3 and elsewhere in the PAD that: a) commercial schools *are* technical schools, and (b) that there were reportedly already too many enrollments in technical schools. The project indicator shown in the PAD for this objective is "share of general secondary students increases from 30% to 50% by 2006," and the discussion of sector issues on page 3 of the PAD describes to the issue of balance between technical and general schooling at the secondary level. Likewise, the first item in the project description on page 6 of the PAD is "conversion of about 315 commercial schools to general schools through renovations and equipment to reach a balance of 50% general, 50% technical school enrollments." This information makes it quite clear that the first item in the PDO was intended to be "increasing access to general secondary education by upgrading commercial schools to general secondary schools."

The presentation of the Project Development Objective in Annex I of the PAD includes no mention of the objective of improving access to general secondary education through upgrading commercial schools to technical schools, but is otherwise similar to the presentation on page 2 of the PAD:

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[1] The Project Status Reports (PSRs) do not correct the error in the PAD's presentation of the first element of the project's development objective. PSRs 1 through 7 retain verbatim the illogical description of the PDO from page 2 of the PAD

"Improving quality and opportunity of secondary education by: a) increasing equality of opportunity in access to general secondary education through flexible options for study within and between branches of the system, b) better aligning curricula and skill needs with the skill needs of employers and higher education, and c) providing professional development for teachers on the new curricula and assessment techniques. Strengthening educational management to strengthen the capacity of the education system at the central level and in selected governorates and schools to deliver quality education by: better defining responsibilities, b) strengthening accountability mechanisms, and c) providing professional development for school heads and administrators."[12]

Schedule 2 of the Development Credit Agreement (DCA) describes the PDO in very general terms: *"to assist the Borrower to establish the basis for an equitable education system through quality and opportunity improvement and strengthening of management and accountability procedures."*

Key Indicators. The key indicators presented of page 2 of the PAD for monitoring and evaluating achievement of the PDO were the following five outcomes:

- *Share of general secondary students increases from 30% to 50% by 2006.*
- *Share of technical secondary graduates entering higher education rises from 5% to 8%.*
- *Employability of secondary-school graduates from project schools improves as assessed by tracer studies.*
- *Graduates from project schools achieve good pass marks on school-leaving examination as compared to non-upgraded schools.*
- *At least 70% of School Management Teams in project schools are judged competent in duties as outlined in new job criteria by 2006.*[13]

The presentation of the PDO in Annex 1 of the PAD includes a sixth key performance indicator: *"curriculum and assessment aligned."*

The first of these bulleted key performance indicators addresses the objective of increasing access to general secondary education by upgrading commercial schools to general secondary schools, but there is no performance indicator for the second part of the first instrument listed in the PDO: *"providing flexible options for study within and between branches of the system."* In addition to these performance indicators for evaluating project performance in relation to the project development objective, Annex 1 of the PAD lists eighteen key performance indicators for evaluating project performance in relation to the project's planned outputs (or instruments for achieving the project development objective).

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

Despite the inconsistencies in presentation of the PDO in various project documents and the change that was made in monitoring indicators (described below), the PDO was not officially revised from the version presented in the PAD. The June 16, 2010

Restructuring Paper[14] includes on page v the altered description of the first project objective that was introduced in PSR number 8, but states on page 2 that "the original PDO remains unchanged." The Restructuring Paper indicates that two of the PDO result indicators were reformulated as follows:

Original PDO Result Indicators	Reformulated PDO Result Indicators
Share of general secondary students increases from 30% to 50% by 2006	Share of general secondary students increases from 30% to 40% by 2010
School management teams in project schools are judged competent in duties as outlined in the new job criteria by 2006	At least 70% of school management teams in project schools are judged competent in duties as outlined in new job criteria by 2012

This description of the change in the second result indicator is not quite accurate. The original result indicator for the PDO of strengthened institutional capacity is *"At least 70% of School Management Teams in project schools are judged competent in duties as outlined in new job criteria by 2006."*[15] Thus, the 2010 Restructuring changed the target date for developing skills of school management teams, but not the content of that indicator.

The following explanation is provided in the 2010 Restructuring Paper for the changes in PDO results indicators:

"Two minor changes were introduced to the PDO indicators. First, the PDO indicator related to the share of students enrolled in general secondary education was reformulated and scaled down from 50% to 40% to reflect the decision to stop converting commercial schools into general secondary schools. Second, the PDO indicator related to school management practices was defined more precisely with a clear expected target value. The instrument to monitor the second PDO indicator, which is related to school management improvement, has yet to be developed. So far the project has been reporting on the number of school managers and school management team being trained. During the extension the project will develop an instrument to assess management competencies. It is expected that the original goal of the project – i.e. 70% of project teams in project schools are judged competent in duties outlines in the new job description – will be achieved by the end of the third extension period."[16]

The Restructuring Paper explains that the rationale for changing the results indicator for the share of students enrolled in general secondary education was based on the decision to suspend the conversion of commercial schools to general secondary schools, and to instead use the funds which were allocated for that activity to upgrade schools. (See section 1.6 below for a fuller description of this change.) The June 2010 project restructuring also revised two intermediate results indicators and added three new ones, as follows:

Original Intermediate Results Indicators	Reformulated or New Intermediate Results Indicators
Component One:	
A framework and common core courses developed for a comprehensive and unified secondary curriculum	A core curriculum framework developed, including the curriculum for core subject areas
NEW	At least 30% of project schools comply with minimum accreditation standards with respect to infrastructure and learning equipment
NEW	Core subject matter teachers in participating schools master the new curriculum framework
Component Two:	
School management responsibilities devolved to local levels	Board of Trustees set up in all project schools
NEW	School Administrators in project schools are competent on the use of ICT for enhanced school management.

The first of these revised results indicators scaled down expectations for curriculum reform under the project by eliminating the development of common core courses under the new curriculum framework. At the same time however, the new indicator on teachers' mastery of the new curriculum framework added a more results-based measure of whether teachers understood the new curriculum framework and what it implied for their teaching. The second indicator for component one was added to provide a benchmark for measuring infrastructure and equipment improvements following the decision to suspend the conversion of commercial schools and to use the funds allocated for that purpose instead for facilities and equipment improvements for existing general secondary schools (Sections 1.6 and 1.7). The first indicator for component two was similarly scaled down to involve only the establishment of Boards of Trustees in all project schools, without requiring that school management responsibilities be devolved to schools. Boards of Trustees were to have played a role in implementation of school improvement plans under the school grant subcomponent. Elimination of school grants under the earlier 2006 project amendment (Sections 1.6 and 1.7) diminished the role of school Boards. The new, second indicator for component two also added a more results-based measure of whether school management teams could effectively use the new information and communication technology (ICT) equipment provided under the project. The Restructuring paper stated that under the extension, the project would develop an instrument to assess management competencies.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

(original and revised, briefly describe the "primary target group" identified in the PAD and as captured in the PDO, as well as any other individuals and organizations expected to benefit from the project)

Targeted Beneficiaries. The PAD identified two levels of beneficiaries: a) the staff, students, and communities in the catchment areas of the specific schools which were to be converted from commercial to general and provided with enhanced facilities under the project, and b) a wider population which was expected to benefit from project-supported improvements in national-level programs, including secondary students who were

expected to become more productive and "better prepared for life," families and communities who would benefit socially and economically from "better prepared citizens," private employers and consumers who would benefit from a better prepared workforce, and higher education institutions which would benefit from more qualified and flexible incoming students.[17] The DCA contains no statement on the project's expected beneficiaries.

Additional Beneficiaries. The project also provided benefits for additional beneficiaries that were not recognized at appraisal. Under the project's original design, the immediate beneficiaries were to be the students that attended the commercial schools that were upgraded and converted to general secondary schools under the project. Those students – who would otherwise have faced limited options upon graduation from commercial schooling -- would presumably benefit from higher-quality programs during their secondary studies and richer options upon graduation. The decision taken during implementation to suspend conversion of commercial schools and to use the remaining proceeds of the school conversion component to upgrade existing general secondary schools (Sections 1.6, 1.7, and 2.2) added a new category of beneficiaries – students who attend the existing general secondary schools that were upgraded under the project. Upgrading existing general secondary schools did not require as extensive an investment in facilities and equipment as did conversion of commercial schools to general secondary schools. For that reason, the suspension of commercial school conversion and its replacement with general school upgrading allowed a larger number of schools and students to benefit from this activity (Section 1.6): a total 205 out of the planned 315 commercial schools were converted to general secondary schools, and 593 existing general secondary schools were upgraded under the project.

1.5 Original Components (*as approved*)

Component 1: Improving Quality and Opportunity ($232.6 million)

As described in the PAD,[18] this component comprised three sub-components designed to improve quality and opportunity in secondary education:

- **Converting about 315 commercial schools to general schools to reach balanced secondary enrollments of 50% general and 50% technical.** Upgrading commercial schools to meet standards for general education core courses was to consist of provision of facilities (science labs and learning resource centers) and equipment (laboratory equipment, computers, and multimedia technologies).
- **Developing the framework for a comprehensive general curriculum, relevant electives, a wider range of assessment methodologies, and associated teacher training and materials.** This subcomponent comprised three distinct activities:
    - developing new curriculum frameworks for general and technical secondary schools with core courses and options for students of different ability levels,

- developing new tools for assessing the effectiveness of the courses which to be developed under the new curriculum framework. This activity was also to include the development of new school-based assessments of student learning achievement, and
- designing instructional materials and in-service training programs to make teachers competent in delivering the new curriculum.

- **Providing equipment and training to integrate computer technology into teaching practice.** In-service teacher training under this sub-component had three main objectives:
  - to make teachers computer literate,
  - to make teachers competent in using computers to deliver the existing curriculum, and
  - to make teachers competent in using computers to deliver the new core curriculum when it is developed.

Component 2: Strengthening Institutional Capacity (US$17.4 million)

This component comprised short-term activities to improve local school management and community and business involvement, and longer-term strategies to improve education system management at the central level. This component comprised three sub-components:

- **Promoting community and private-sector involvement in supporting and monitoring school performance** through parent-council activities and public/private partnerships. This involved two activities:
  - **School improvement grants** to finance the implementation of community-generated initiatives to improve local schools, and
  - **Training of parents' councils** in generating and implementing school improvement proposals for financing under the school improvement grants.
- **Developing new quality assurance mechanisms and improving management.** This was intended as a long-term activity to modernize management practices and rationalize the functions of service-delivery agencies, including those responsible for in-service training. The sub-component included technical assistance to review existing management structures and personnel practices, to develop new incentives for improved performance on the part of education system staff, and to elaborate new approaches for school inspection and supervision.
- **Building capacity.** This sub-component was intended to support training for school managers on reform-program activities, including introduction of more effective teaching methods, use of technology as a management and learning tool, and planning joint activities with school councils and the private sector.

The presentation of the project components in the DCA is consistent with but generally less specific than that in the PAD. The school upgrading component is presented in the DCA as *"rehabilitation, conversion, and equipment of selected technical schools."*[19]

1.6 Revised Components

During implementation, the project experienced two significant changes in project components, involving deletion of school improvement grants and suspension of commercial school conversion and its replacement with general secondary school upgrading.

Deletion of School Improvement Grants. The project was amended in March 2006 to extend the project closing date from June 30, 2006 to June 30, 2008 (Section 1.7). The project disbursement schedule was also changed at that time to reallocate the funds originally provided for school grants -- US$1.65 million – to civil works for school upgrading. A March 20, 2006 staff memorandum to Bank management on the proposed closing date extension explains that the Government's request to delete school grants from the project "*was agreed as difficult to administer and implement in Egypt as illustrated by other donors' pilots in the recent past.*" The Aide Mémoire of the November 2007 project supervision mission further explained that school grants were dropped from the project "*due to the difficulties that would be encountered in tracking the funds, as project funds are not allowed to be disbursed directly to schools."* The school grant program is included in the project description in the PAD and DCA.[20]
The project description was not subsequently revised to reflect the removal of the school grant activity from the project.

Suspension of Commercial School Conversion. As described above (Section 1.5), the first sub-component of the first component of the project, and by far the largest expenditure item in the project – accounting for US$199 million of a total project cost of US$250 million – was the conversion of about 315 existing commercial secondary schools into general secondary schools. This activity was designed to enable an increase in general secondary enrollment in relation to technical secondary enrollments, thereby promoting the goal of equal opportunity. It was also designed to improve quality of secondary education, since general secondary schools were widely seen as providing higher quality education than commercial secondary education.

The Aide-Mémoire of the October/November 2003 supervision mission reported that:

> *"During discussions with MOE and Govemorate officials, it has been agreed that reaching the targeted number of 315 converted schools may be difficult. However, reaching the 50% ratio of students in general secondary education which is targeted by the project may be achieved through increasing numbers of students in existing secondary schools which are not functioning with their full capacity through lowering the score required for joining general secondary education.*[21]

Because of public resistance to conversion of commercial schools under the project, the Government suspended the school conversion program during the 2003/2004 school year.[22]

The June, 2004 SEEP supervision mission endorsed this decision, apparently without management review. It reported that:

"The mission of June 04 has given options to speed up the project implementation and focus on limited and achievable goals such as to stop school conversion, start the curriculum process on a small scale, and move faster on training and institutional development activities…. The supervision mission has noted resistance by communities to the conversion in the absence of understanding the rationale behind it. The mission has recommended to cease conversion by September, 2004 while addressing community awareness to eliminate resistance in the existing converted schools areas."[23]

Although this statement does not indicate what was to be done with the remaining funds under the school conversion activity, the Aide Mémoire and ISR of the July 2006 supervision mission reported that they were being used for upgrading existing general secondary schools. Subsequent supervision missions reported that this effort was continuing. By the final closing date of October 31, 2012, a total of 584 general secondary schools had been upgraded under the component. The Aide Mémoire of the July 2004 mission reported that the PDO target of 50% of secondary enrollments in general secondary schools would be met by building more new secondary schools rather than by school conversion. Subsequent supervision missions reiterated the same argument.

Despite the significance of this change and the fact that the Government requested in February 2006 that the Bank revise the project description to delete mention of school conversion,[24] the project description was not revised and senior Bank management was not notified of the change until the 2010 project Restructuring – six years after the change was implemented. The June 2010 Restructuring Paper reported that school conversion under the project was being suspended due to public resistance, and that the remaining funds allocated for this activity were to be used instead for upgrading teaching conditions in "the same original schools that the project had targeted for conversion." This statement was not entirely accurate, since the schools that were originally targeted for conversion were commercial schools, whereas the schools that were upgraded after the change were newly-selected, existing general secondary schools.

However worthy its intention, the decision to suspend the conversion of commercial schools to general schools and to use the funds allocated for that activity instead for upgrading general secondary schools was not consistent with the project description as presented in the PAD and the DCA, both of which included conversion of technical schools but not upgrading of general schools. It also altered the development outcome of the school conversion activity--from reducing technical enrolment and expanding general enrollment to improving general education quality, since upgrading of general schools was not designed to expand their capacity. The suspension of school conversion also implies an unrecognized change in project beneficiaries (Section 1.4), and raises questions about consistency of general school upgrading with the project development objective (Section 2.2) and about the rationale for the school conversion component (Section 3.1).

1.7 Other significant changes
(in design, scope and scale, implementation arrangements and schedule, and funding allocations)

The project was amended eight times during the course of implementation, including two Level II Restructurings.[25] Listed in chronological order, these were as follows:

Amendment of March 23, 2003[26] – allowed use of statements of expenditure and financial management reports as basis of disbursements, and reallocated funds from the "unallocated" category to "training" and "project management."

Amendment of March 21, 2006[27] – extended the project Closing Date from June 30, 2006 to June 30, 2008 and reallocated funds from the deleted school fund component to civil works for school upgrading. Although the school grant activity is specifically included in the project description in the PAD and DCA,[28] the project description was not subsequently revised to reflect the removal of the school grant activity from the project. The deletion of the school grant activity is not reflected either in the 2010 Restructuring or the 2012 Restructuring.

Amendment of June 29, 2008[29] – extended the Closing Date from June 30, 2008 to June 30, 2010 and further amended the project disbursement schedule.

Amendment of December 31, 2008[30] – modified Schedule 3 of the Credit Agreement to allow procurement of small works on the basis of quotations from at least three qualified contractors.

Restructuring of June 29, 2010[31] – This Level 2 Restructuring extended the Closing Date for the third time -- from June 30, 2010 to June 30, 2012 -- and revised PDO indicators and intermediate results indicators as described above (Section 1.3). At the same time, it reported that the school conversion program was being suspended due to public resistance, and the remaining funds allocated for this activity were to be used instead for upgrading the project's targeted secondary schools.

Restructuring of April 17, 2012[32] – amended the disbursement schedule, reallocating unused funds from other categories to allow completion of school upgrading to meet infrastructure standards set by the National Quality Assurance and Accreditation Authority.

Amendment of July 3, 2012[33] **--** extended the project Closing Date from June 30, 2012 to October 31, 2012 to allow completion of the ongoing upgrading of 67 project schools.

Amendment of November 19, 2012[34] – amended the disbursement schedule to allow completion of the ongoing upgrading of 67 project schools to meet infrastructure standards set by the National Quality Assurance and Accreditation Authority.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

(including whether lessons of earlier operations were taken into account, risks and their mitigations identified, and adequacy of participatory processes, as applicable)

Project identification benefited from the experience gained through preparation and implementation of the then-ongoing Education Enhancement Project (focusing on basic education) and, especially, through a close working partnership with USAID and other donors in the education sector.

There were several deficiencies in project preparation and design, some of which could have been detected at the time of preparation while others became apparent in the course of implementation. These include: inconsistent and inaccurate presentation of the project development objective, weak rationale for the school conversion component, incomplete social analysis and public awareness outreach, incomplete preparation of the school grant activity, and lack of a baseline for evaluation of development outcomes.

Inconsistency and Inaccuracy in Presentation of the Project Development Objective. As described above (Section 1.2) the various presentations of the first of four elements of the Project Development Objective in the PAD, DCA, and ISRs and PSRs were inconsistent, misleading, and, in one case, wrong. This lack of attention to presentation of the project's first development objective hinders the evaluation of project outcomes and raises a question about the rationale for the school conversion component.

Weak Rationale for the School Conversion Component. The conversion of commercial secondary schools to general secondary schools under the project was consistent with the Bank's education policy at the time of appraisal, which advocated the introduction of specialized vocational and technical education only after completion of general secondary education. This policy was based on widespread findings that general secondary education tends to be more responsive than vocational or technical secondary education to evolving skill requirements, and therefore that general secondary education typically leads to higher returns for graduates and is less costly than secondary vocational and technical education.[35] The project's support for conversion of commercial secondary school to general secondary schools also reflected the fact that there were serious problems in content and delivery of technical secondary education in Egypt. The commercial-school curriculum, for example, included instruction in typing on mechanical typewriters, but no instruction on computer-based word processing. In that environment, replacement of commercial schools with more up-to-date and better-equipped general secondary schools was seen as an appropriate means of raising quality and relevance of secondary education in Egypt. However, apart from citing problems with existing commercial secondary schools and asserting that education quality was higher in general secondary schools than in technical secondary schools, the PAD did not present a strong justification for the school conversion component – by far the largest component on the project. It did not, for example, present evidence on quality differences or differences in labor-market outcomes between general secondary and commercial secondary schools.

Nor did it consider potentially more cost-effective alternatives to commercial school conversion – such as the use of available places in existing general secondary schools, or the improvement of commercial schools by updating their curricula and improving their facilities and staffing. Ultimately, the objective of increased general secondary enrollments was pursued outside the project, by building new general secondary schools under the Government's ongoing school building program rather than by conversion of commercial schools (Section 3.1). The analysis in the PAD did not discuss this possibility of meeting the goal of increased general school enrollments through this activity rather than through project-financed commercial school conversion.

Incomplete Social Analysis and Public Awareness Outreach. As explained by several supervision missions, the school conversion program was suspended because of public resistance to school conversion (Section 1.6). Many parents of girls – especially in rural areas -- opposed conversion of these schools to general secondary schools because they considered that a technical school diploma offered their daughters better opportunities for employment and marriage than a diploma from a general secondary school. Social analysis during project preparation could have identified this concern as a possible obstacle to implementation of school conversion, and could have addressed it either through a change in the component design or through a public awareness campaign to help overcome parental resistance to school conversion.

Incomplete Preparation of School Grant Activity. As described above (Section 1.6), the November, 2007 project supervision mission reported that school grants were dropped from the project "*due to the difficulties that would be encountered in tracking the funds, as project funds are not allowed to be disbursed directly to schools.*"[36]

The fact that the activity had to be dropped from the project due to non-feasibility of implementation is an indication that the activity was not adequately prepared. The problems that emerged at the start of implementation could have been detected through due diligence in preparing the project. Technical problems in implementing school grants are a familiar problem in Bank-financed projects. It was already a well-established practice in the Bank at the time of SEEP preparation to pilot school grants during project preparation in order to identify and address potential problems in school grant implementation. This lesson learned in implementation of other projects was apparently not taken on board during preparation of the SEEP. It emerged, however, during SEEP implementation. A supervision mission in 2002 reported that the Government had decided to delay implementation of school improvement grants under the SEEP project until they had been piloted under the ongoing EEP project.[37]

This plan was not followed up; the experience of the school grant pilot under the EEP was not mentioned in any subsequent supervision reports or Aides Mémoires, nor was there an effort to revive the school grant activity under the SEEP. Another indication of incomplete preparation of the school grant activity is that it is not mentioned in the project design summary in Annex 1 of the PAD among the activities to support devolution of school management under component two of the project, and no performance indicators are provided to track implementation progress.

Lack of a Baseline for Evaluation of Development Outcomes. Annex 14 in the PAD states that "*as part of project preparation, a tracer study combining both retrospective and prospective approaches will be carried out to provide a baseline for measuring the success of SEEP interventions.*"[38] In fact, no baseline survey was ever carried out; monitoring and evaluation (M&E) were neglected throughout project implementation (Sections 2.3 and 3.2). Lack of a project baseline and of suitable outcome indicators means that development outcomes of the project cannot be observed directly, but must be inferred on the basis of indirect evidence.

2.2 Implementation
(including any project changes/restructuring, mid-term review, Project at Risk status, and actions taken, as applicable)

Project implementation was adversely affected by staffing discontinuities and by lack of team staff with interest and expertise in monitoring and evaluation and in the qualitative dimensions of the project (Section 5). This was true of staffing particularly on the Borrower side, but staffing discontinuities also affected Bank supervision. Frequent changes in Ministers of Education – with six successive Ministers between 2004 and 2012 – led to serious delays and discontinuities. Examples of ministerial decisions that delayed implementation were the change of implementation responsibility from the PPMU to the Educational Support Foundation and the decision to subject all project implementation decisions to Steering Committee review (Section 5). An important reason for the unusually long implementation period for the project was the Government's reluctance to relinquish concessionary funds under this final International Development Association (IDA) operation. The Government made strong appeals for each of the four extensions of the project closing date. On the occasion of the 2010 extension, the project team recommended closing the project, but the Country Department supported another extension (and ultimately a fourth extension) in the interest of maintaining country relations. Despite the shortcomings that necessitated four closing date extensions, the prolonged implementation did provide an opportunity to extend the dialogue with the Government on the importance of the educational changes sought under the project, and to achieve more project outputs than would have been possible if the project were closed earlier.

As described below, SEEP implementation was also significantly affected by the suspension of commercial school conversion and its replacement with general school upgrading. In addition to the effects of that change, a decision by the Government that was not related to the project – restoration of six-year primary schooling – also had implications for project implementation. Civic and political disruption associated with the 2011 revolution also contributed to delays in project implementation and in release of official enrollment statistics for recent years

Suspension of Commercial School Conversion. The decision to suspend the conversion of commercial schools to general schools in 2004 and to use the funds allocated for that activity instead for upgrading general secondary schools fundamentally altered the approach of the largest component of the project -- from expanding general education

capacity to improving general education quality, and from converting commercial schools to upgrading existing general secondary schools. It also raised a question about whether this new activity was consistent with the original PDO and project description as presented in the PAD and the DCA. As stated on page 2 of the PAD, the Project Development Objective provides both a general objective – *"to improve the quality and opportunity in secondary education"* – and four specific instruments for achieving that objective, including *"by increasing access to general secondary education through upgrading commercial schools to general secondary schools and providing flexible options for study within and between branches of the system."*[39]

While the upgrading of existing general secondary schools is consistent with the PDO's general objective, it is not consistent with any of the four specific instruments which the PDO provides for achieving its general objective. As stated in the PDO, the rationale for the school conversion component was to improve access to general secondary education. Upgrading existing general secondary schools presumably improved teaching and learning conditions in those schools, but did not improve access to general secondary education, since the upgrading effort did not increase schools' capacity. Upgrading existing general secondary schools also does not fall under any of the other three instruments specified in the PDO for improving secondary education quality and opportunity (Section 3.1). The suspension of commercial school conversion also raises an important question about the original rationale for the school conversion component (Section 3.1).

Lengthened Primary Cycle. In 1988, as a cost-saving measure, the Government shortened the primary-schooling cycle to five years, leaving the content and duration of preparatory and secondary education unchanged. But student performance in preparatory and secondary schooling suffered as a result of the shortened primary cycle, and in 2005 the Government reinstated the sixth year of primary schooling. These changes in the duration of the primary-school cycle caused significant disruption in education programs. In the initial year of shortened primary schooling, students completing both grade 5 and grade 6 were admitted to the first year of preparatory schooling, leading to a very large cohort that strained classroom and teacher capacity as it made its way through preparatory and secondary education. This ripple in enrollments was mirrored by an enrollment deficit when the sixth year of primary education was restored in 2005. In that school year as students from grade 5 entered the reinstated sixth grade, the only enrollments in the first year of preparatory schooling were repeater students from the first year of preparatory schooling. Preparatory and secondary enrollments remained below normal for the next five years as this small cohort of "gap year" students made its way through preparatory and secondary schooling. Normal enrollments resumed only in 2011. These depressed enrollments during the six years of transition to the restored six-year primary cycle make it difficult to compare secondary enrollments and student performance in the years 2008 through 2010 with enrollments and performance in the prior years (Section 3.2).

Civic and Political Disruption. There was widespread civic and political disruption during the last two years of project implementation as a result of the 2011 revolution and its aftermath. Although it is not specifically acknowledged in the project record, this

disruption presumably contributed to the delays in project implementation that necessitated the final two closing date extensions, as well as the delays in release of official enrollment statistics for the final years of project implementation (Section 3.2).

Mid-Term Review. A Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the project was carried out in March 2005, just fifteen months before the original project Closing Date. Review findings are summarized in the ISR of the MTR mission.[40]

There is no record in the project file of an Aide Mémoire for the MTR mission. As noted during the MTR, implementation progress up to that point was limited largely to hardware procurement (facilities and equipment) under the school conversion component. The MTR attributed the lack of progress on the "quality-related activities" under the project - including training and reform of curriculum and assessment – to *"the inhibitive reform context in the Ministry of Education."* The MTR also reported that monitoring and evaluation under the project was "unsatisfactory." With the exception of monitoring and evaluation, for which it included specific recommended actions, the MTR did not propose specific actions to address the implementation obstacles. It also did not discuss the unresolved issues with the school conversion component following the suspension of commercial school conversion in 2004 (Sections 2.2 and 3.1).

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

Monitoring and Evaluation Design. PAD Annex 14, "Social Assessment and Evaluation Component," acknowledged the importance of tracer studies and employer surveys for evaluating the development outcomes of project interventions, and describes a tracer study that was to be carried out during project preparation *"to provide a baseline for measuring the success of SEEP interventions."*[41] It also described the employer survey and graduate tracer study that was to be carried out during implementation to determine the labor-market and higher education experiences of graduates from project schools and control-group schools. Annex 1 also listed monitoring instruments (including tracer studies) for each of the project development objectives and project outputs. But the only mention of these activities in the body of the PAD was the performance indicators that are listed on page 2 of the PAD. These activities are not otherwise described or discussed in the text of the PAD – either under the description of project objectives, project components, or implementation arrangements. The only mention of M&E in the text of the PAD is the statement that "*The Planning, Programming, and Monitoring Unit (PPMU) has the overall responsibility of project planning and monitoring*."[42] Even that briefest of references fails to mention evaluation as an essential part of M&E.

The DCA includes a dated covenant that the Borrower will provide to the Bank by April 30, 2003 a report which reviews the outputs of the project and the progress made in achievement of its development objectives, as well as a description of the measures which are necessary to achieve project output and outcome targets during the remaining term of the project, and will by June 30, 2003 review this report with the Bank and take all necessary measures to complete the project efficiently.[43]

Monitoring and Evaluation Implementation. Despite the elaborate plans for outcome evaluations presented in Annex 14 and Annex 1 of the PAD, the only M&E actually carried out under the project consisted of monitoring outputs. There was no evaluation of project development outcomes during implementation and no baseline established as a basis for such an evaluation. A stakeholders' workshop which was held in the final months of implementation [44] assessed stakeholders' reported perceptions of the effectiveness of project interventions, but there was no evaluation of actual effectiveness in terms of higher-level outcomes, including new concepts and skills learned, changes in teaching practices, learning outcomes for students, or labor-market and higher-education outcomes.

To put that situation in perspective, it is important to recognize that evaluation of the impact of interventions which are designed to improve learning and labor-market outcomes of education is intrinsically more difficult than for any other category of development interventions. Rigorous evaluation of interventions to improve student-learning outcomes requires highly technical skills in design of assessment instruments, as well as a very demanding experimental design for treatment and control groups. It is also very costly. Even when such evaluation is well planned from the start, parents' resistance to having their children assigned to a control group (and therefore denied the advantages of improved educational inputs) often makes this approach politically infeasible. Labor-market outcomes are difficult to evaluate for another reason – because of the time lag that occurs between the intervention (improved education inputs) and employment outcomes. Tracer studies often suffer from low significance and bias because of low response rates, due to the inherent difficulty in tracking students' labor-market movements after graduation. For all these reasons, rigorous evaluation of learning outcomes and labor-market outcomes in Bank-financed education projects is rarely achieved.

Despite this caveat, however, it is difficult to overlook the fact that monitoring and evaluation received essentially no attention from Bank supervision missions during the first four years of project implementation. The first 13 ISRs, from May 1999 through May 2004 reported the same issue and action for monitoring and evaluation:

Issue	Action
"PPMU needs to establish a strong monitoring and evaluation system"	"PPMU will establish a monitoring and evaluation system by hiring an expert in monitoring and evaluation"

Despite the lack of progress in developing a monitoring and evaluation plan and the fact that the dated covenant on monitoring was actually in non-compliance when the last three of these ISRs were archived, the first 13 ISRs rated M&E progress as "satisfactory." The November 2004 ISR was the first to rate M&E performance as "unsatisfactory," but it provided neither a reason for the downgrading nor proposed corrective actions. It also erroneously reported that the project was in compliance with all project covenants. The Mid-Term Review mission of March 2005 maintained the "unsatisfactory" M&E rating and reported that the project was in non-compliance with the dated covenant on M&E for failing to establish a monitoring and evaluation reporting system.[45]

It reported that the PPMU agreed that a full-time expert on M&E would be recruited by May 2005. The March 2005 Mid-Term Review mission established several benchmarks as a condition for the Bank's consideration of the Government's request for an extension of the project Closing Date from June 30, 2006 to June 30, 2008.[46]

Among those benchmarks was a requirement that the Government develop a suitable monitoring and evaluation plan and recruit a qualified monitoring and evaluation specialist to lead M&E implementation. The October 2005 supervision mission reported that all benchmarks were fulfilled and on that basis recommended that the extension be approved, even though the monitoring and evaluation specialist had not been recruited.[47]

Bank supervision of monitoring and evaluation improved after 2007 with the arrival of a new team leader, a new education sector manager and a new Country Director (Section 5.1b), but these efforts were not able the make up for the neglect of monitoring and evaluation during project preparation and the first years of implementation.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance
(focusing on issues and their resolution, as applicable)

Financial management under the project was briefly rated as "unsatisfactory" by two SEEP supervision missions in 2010 after a 2009 Special Purpose Financial Management Review recommended an external audit and quantification of payment of bonuses and severance to consultants as well as seconded employees from other ministries in order to establish their eligibility for financing under the project. Since this review had not yet occurred at the time of the 2010 missions, project financial management performance was temporarily rated as "unsatisfactory." The June 2011 mission reported that the financial management issues raised by the 2009 Special Purpose Review had been resolved, but was still awaiting implementation of recommended improvements in financial management reporting. On that basis, it upgraded the rating for financial management performance from "unsatisfactory" to "moderately unsatisfactory."

2.5 Post-Completion Operation/Next Phase
(including transition arrangement to post-completion operation of investments financed by present operation, Operation & Maintenance arrangements, sustaining reforms and institutional capacity, and next phase/follow-up operation, if applicable)

Despite the urgings of the last several supervision missions, the Government did not prepare a plan for maintenance and continuation of the actions launched under the project. A number of actions – including approval and introduction of the 10^{th}-grade common core curriculum and preparation of new textbooks under the new curriculum framework – need to be followed up to ensure that the actions carried out under the project deliver their intended benefits.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

The project is rated as "marginally unsatisfactory" for outcomes, based on "marginally unsatisfactory" ratings for relevance, efficacy, and efficiency, as explained below.

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

(to current country and global priorities, and Bank assistance strategy)

Relevance of objectives, design, and implementation is rated as "marginally unsatisfactory." Although the overall objective of improved quality and relevance of secondary education was and remains highly relevant to current development priorities and with current Bank country and sectoral assistance strategies,[48] there are important questions about the appropriateness of school conversion -- the largest component of the project -- as an instrument for improved opportunity. Additional shortcoming of project design involves the over-ambitiousness of the specific goals for educational change, the lack of a satisfactory monitoring and evaluation design, and failure to detect the constraints that led to suspension of school conversion and school grants.

A major objective of the project is to provide more market-relevant skills by increasing the share of general secondary enrollments. This objective is consistent with the Bank's education policy and with much of the Bank's recent work in the education sector: general secondary education is often seen as providing more job flexibility and better preparation in the skills most valued by employers–including quantitative, scientific, and problem-solving skills–than does technical or vocational education. However, the rationale provided in the project documentation for the component that addresses the enrollment composition issue and accounts for more than 80% of project expenditures is deficient in two respects: first, in establishing the need for changing the composition of secondary school enrollments to give greater attention to general education and less to technical education, and, second, in justifying conversion of commercial schools to general secondary schools as the most appropriate instrument for achieving that composition. As implemented, the project gave disproportionate attention to school conversion as an instrument of greater flexibility among education programs, to the neglect of other actions to improve flexibility. (See "Flexible Options for Study" under "Outcomes" in Section 3.2.)

The PAD presents a weak rationale for supporting the reform program target of 50% technical enrollment and 50% general enrollment in secondary education. That rationale is based largely on assertions and assumptions,[49] rather than on evidence. The only evidence-based part of the PAD's rationale for moving to the target mix of general/secondary enrollments is that only 5% of technical secondary students progress to higher education. In Annex 4, the PAD presents an elaborate benefit-cost analysis of the project, but its findings are based on unsupported assumptions about earnings of graduates from upgraded schools. There is no comparison of the actual earnings or employment experience of general secondary and technical secondary graduates in the labor market (discussed in Section 3.3), and no discussion of earnings differentials for technical and general school graduates as a rationale for school conversion**.**

Apart from the question of the appropriateness of the goal of increasing the share of technical secondary enrollments, there is also a question about the appropriateness of school conversion as an instrument for achieving that goal. Several early supervision missions reported (Section 1.6) that the enrollment target could be met more easily by other means -- by lowering the admission threshold for entry into existing general secondary schools with excess capacity, and by giving priority to building new general secondary schools under the Government's ongoing school building program and building no new secondary commercial schools. Ambiguity in the rationale for this, the largest component of the project, is particularly significant because it affects the nature and appropriateness of the school conversion and upgrading actions carried out under the project. These actions account for by far the largest share of planned project expenditures -- US$199 million of the US$250 million total planned project expenditures, and further augmented when the school fund component was deleted from the project.

If there had been excess capacity in existing general secondary schools as the June 2004 mission reports, this should have been acknowledged and reflected in project design. And if indeed there were excess capacity in general secondary schools, the project's support for creation of additional general secondary school capacity through school conversion would presumably not be needed, at least to the same degree. Yet the PAD includes no mention of excess capacity in existing general secondary schools, or discussion of how excess capacity could help meet the Reform Program's enrollment targets.[50] The supply/demand analysis presented in the PAD as a basis for the school conversion component[51] is based on unsubstantiated assumptions about how improved quality of secondary education was expected to motivate higher overall demand for secondary education. This does not establish a justification for conversion of commercial schools to general secondary schools. Not only is it based on assumption rather than evidence; it also does not differentiate between technical and general secondary enrollments and does not examine the alternative of meeting the reform program's enrollment target through the planned expansion of secondary technical and general education school capacity under the Government's ongoing school construction program.

A more basic question that can be raised about the rationale for the school conversion component is whether the Reform Program's enrollment goal could have and should have been met through new general secondary school construction under the Government's ongoing school construction program rather than through project-supported school conversion. In its presentation of project alternatives considered and rejected, the PAD stated that: *"The Government chose not to construct new schools under the project. Although access to secondary education remains an issue, the Government has a significant construction program for new schools as demonstrated by the fact that almost all triple-shift secondary schools have disappeared."*[52] And in its supply and demand analysis, the PAD stated that: *"The existence of a significant number of shift secondary schools (with 22% of enrollment) should be seen as an accommodation to student demand, rather than an indication of an overall supply constraint. A second indicator of the Government's success in accommodating demand for secondary places is the large-scale school-building program of recent years."*[53]

These statements appear to undermine the rationale for the school conversion component under the project. They appears to say that access goals in secondary education could be met through the Government's vigorous ongoing school construction program for secondary schools, and do not need project resources to help augment school capacity. Indeed, implementation experience under the project revealed that situation to be true: When the Government suspended the school conversion program in 2004, it asserted that it could still meet the target of raising the share of general secondary enrollments in overall secondary enrollment by constructing new general secondary schools (but not technical secondary schools) under its ongoing school construction program rather than through project-financed school conversion. This approach has been endorsed by all SEEP supervision missions since 2003, as well as by the 2010 Project Restructuring (Sections 1.6 and 1.7). Since the suspension of school conversion, all project documents report that the Government's ongoing school construction program is expected to eventually meet the original 50% target for general school enrollments, and to meet the revised target of 40% general secondary enrollments by project closing. If the Government's ongoing school construction program could meet the Reform Program enrollment goal -- as it is in fact doing since the suspension of school conversion -- it is not clear why the project should have supported school conversion.[54]

Implementation experience revealed that the project's specific goals for change in education programs and processes were over-ambitious. Annex 2 lists the 23 specific results that were sought under the project. Four of these involve upgrading of facilities or delivery of training, and were overachieved during implementation. The other eighteen results sought under the project involved changes in educational programs, processes, or behavior of teachers, school managers and students. A flavor of the ambitiousness of these targets is provided by two examples: a) development of a new curriculum framework by 2000 and development and implementation of a new scheme of core courses under that curriculum framework by 2003; and b) development and validation of new instruments for assessing the quality of school facilities, management, and teaching by 2003. Even with four closing-date extensions and 13 years of project implementation, only two of these 18 targets were confirmed as achieved. For most of them, there was no record of progress or effort of any kind. The single area of tangible progress in education program reform – the development and approval of a new curriculum framework – has yet to be implemented. There were also modest improvements in processes for promoting teachers and for selecting school principals. In hindsight, this experience reveals how overambitious the project appraisal team and sector management were in setting performance goals for the project.

In addition to the problems of appropriateness of the school conversion component and over-ambitiousness of aims for educational change, there were several deficiencies in project design, described elsewhere in the ICR. These include:

- incomplete social analysis of school conversion component;
- incomplete preparation of school fund activity; and
- neglect of monitoring and evaluation.

These shortcomings in project preparation contributed significantly to problems that arose during implementation.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

(including brief discussion of causal linkages between outputs and outcomes, with details on outputs in Annex 2)

The project is rated as "marginally unsatisfactory" for achievement of project development objectives, based on the extent to which the project objectives were achieved or are expected to be achieved, as explained below.

Outputs. The project made significant progress against its output goals, and overachieved project targets for rehabilitation of facilities and training (Annex 2). Significant project outputs include the following:

- conversion of 205 commercial schools into secondary general schools, representing 65% of the planned target of 315, plus unplanned upgrading of 593 existing general secondary schools;
- completion of a new outcomes and standards-based, modern curriculum framework for secondary education;
- development of a unified 10th grade core curriculum for technical and general secondary schools;
- training of almost 86,000 teachers in the converted schools on use of upgraded facilities and equipment;
- training of 48,000 teachers in the converted and upgraded schools in more effective teaching methods;
- training of 70,000 secondary-school principals and deputy principals in use of technology in school management and in other modern methods of school management;
- training of staff at the national examinations center on modern assessment methodologies and Egypt's participation in the 2007 TIMSS international student assessment in science and math;[55] and
- training of over 1,000 local school Boards of Trustees in their roles in support of school functions, including monitoring school quality.

Outcomes. In contrast to the situation for project outputs, there is much less evidence of progress against the project's development outcomes. As noted below (Section 3.2) and in Annex 2, only one of the targeted changes in education programs and processes was fully implemented. Implementation efforts by the Government and supervision efforts by the Bank reflected insufficient attention to project outcomes throughout implementation (Section 5b). The fulfillment status of project development objective indicators and intermediate results indicators at closing is summarized in the following tables. A fuller record of accomplishments against project goals is presented in Annex 2.

PDO Indicator	Status at Closing
Share of general secondary students increases from 30% to 40% by 2010 (revised from	Apparently achieved. 43.4 % general secondary enrollments for 2010/2011 school

"…50% by 2006")	year, according to data provided to the mission by the MOE, but other MOE information reports a lower figure.[56]
Share of technical secondary graduates entering higher education rises from 5% to 8%	Not confirmed. Data not available.
Employability of secondary-school graduates from project schools improves as assessed by tracer studies.	Not confirmed. No tracer studies carried out, but rate-of-return evidence suggests that this objective was not met (Section 3.3).
Graduates from project schools achieve good pass marks on school leaving examination as compared to non-upgraded schools.	Not confirmed, but other evidence suggests that this objective was not met (Section 3.3).
At least 70% of school management teams in project schools are judged competent in these duties as outlined in new job criteria by 2012 (revised from "….by 2006").	Not confirmed. School management teams were trained and reported satisfaction with training, but impact of training on skill acquisition was not tested and impact on application was not observed. New job criteria were not developed as a basis for judging competence.
Curriculum and assessment aligned.	Not achieved. A new curriculum framework was developed and found satisfactory, but there was little progress in aligning assessment methods and instruments with that framework.

Intermediate Results Indicator	**Status at Closing**
A core curriculum framework developed, including the curriculum for core subject areas. (Revised from "a framework and common core courses developed for a comprehensive and unified secondary curriculum.")	Achieved. Core and elective curricula and some related materials were developed for general and technical education. But the political decision to implement the new framework, including the common 10th grade core curriculum has not yet been taken.
At least 30% of project schools comply with minimum accreditation standards with respect to infrastructure and learning equipment. (Added in 2010 Restructuring.)	Achieved. 30% of project schools comply with national accreditation standards for facilities and learning equipment.
Core subject matter teachers in participating schools master the new curriculum framework. (Added in 2010 Restructuring)	Not confirmed. 11,000 teachers in participating schools trained in new curriculum, but impact of training on mastery of the new curriculum framework was not tested or observed.
Board of Trustees set up in all project schools. (Revised from "School management responsibilities devolved to local level")	Achieved. All project schools have Boards of Trustees, but there is little evidence that they are actively involved in quality monitoring and other school affairs.
School administrators in project schools are competent in the use of ICT for enhanced school management. (Added in 2010 Restructuring.)	Not confirmed. School administrators in project schools received training in use of ICT for management, but impact of training on management competency was not tested nor was an instrument developed to assess management competencies.[57]

- **School Conversion.** Conversion of 205 commercial schools to general secondary schools under the project contributed to the apparent overachievement of the revised secondary-school enrollment target of 40% general school enrollments: according to data provided to the ICR mission by the MOE, 43.4 % of secondary enrollments were in general secondary schools during the 2010/2011 school year.[58] (As described in endnote 53, other MOE data report a lower figure.) In principle, it did so by simultaneously raising the number of student places in general schools and reducing the number of student places in technical schools. Since there was already excess capacity of technical-school places at the start of school conversion (Section 3.1), school conversion contributed to achieving the enrollment target principally by expanding the number of student places in general schools rather than by reducing the number of places in technical schools. The Government's ongoing school building program also contributed to achievement of the enrollment objective. Attributing an appropriate share of the credit to each of these sources – conversion of commercial schools to general schools under the project and creation of new general-school places under the Government's ongoing school building program -- would require a more refined analysis which takes into account the evolution of the number of entry-level students, enrollment constraints in general education (including teacher constraints), excess capacity in technical education schools, evolution of multiple-shift schools, and the evolution of new student places in general education schools through, respectively, conversion of commercial schools to general schools and creation of new general-school places through the Government's ongoing school building program.

- **Flexible Options for Study.** According to the PDO, another instrument for increasing access to general secondary education under the project was to have been the development of "*flexible options for study within and between branches of the system.*"[59]
  As described in the Project Results Summary,[60] this effort was to have comprised several activities, including: a) development of a new curriculum framework; b) training of teachers and school managers in the new curriculum framework; c) development of common core courses; d) development of specializations and electives; and e) development of equitable mechanisms to allow students to transfer between streams. For only the first two of these activities was there any tangible progress under the project (See Annex 2 for details).

- **Curriculum Development.** The new common core curriculum framework which was developed under the project was reviewed and found consistent with the Government's objectives and with international best practice. The Ministry of Education issued a decree authorizing private publishers to develop new textbooks under the new curriculum framework for competitive selection. A new unified core curriculum for 10th grade has been developed and submitted for approval by the Minister of Education. The common core curriculum was intended to be implemented in both general secondary schools and technical secondary schools as a means of providing greater flexibility between the general

and technical education streams. Delays in approval and implementation have been attributed to the disruptions surrounding the 2011 revolution and its aftermath. [61]

- **Training.** As summarized in the above description of project outputs, five types of training were carried out under the project, including training of almost 86,000 teachers in converted schools on use of upgraded facilities and equipment and training of 48,000 teachers in converted and upgraded schools in more effective teaching methods. Evaluations of training effectiveness were conducted under the project, typically at the conclusion of each training session. A retrospective evaluation was also carried out in the May 2012 stakeholders' consultation and evaluation workshop (Annex 6). This evaluation consisted of participants' reported levels of satisfaction with the training (often referred to as "level 1 evaluation" [62]) and evaluators' observations on the effectiveness of training delivery (including availability of resources, use of teaching strategies, attendance rates etc.) and on interview data from participants, trainers, and others involved on the quality and relevance of program content and the effectiveness of delivery. The evaluations of project-supported training reported a high level of participant satisfaction with the training that they received, but they do not shed light on the actual outcomes of training. More revealing insights on training outcomes would require higher-order evaluation that looks at: a) learning outcomes, or actual new knowledge and skills acquired through training as evaluated by a post-training assessment examination (level 2 evaluation), b) behavior outcomes, or actual application of new knowledge and skills as assessed by observation in the workplace (level 3 evaluation), or c) result outcomes as measured by various measures of productivity such as student learning achievement or eventual labor-market performance (level 4 evaluation). Although Annex 1 of the PAD includes observation of training outcomes (level 3 evaluation) among the monitoring and evaluation instruments that were to be used to assess the impacts for project-supported training, this observation of actual outcomes of project-supported training did not take place. Admittedly, evaluation of higher-order outcomes of teacher training is difficult, and rarely achieved in Bank-financed operations.

- **Upgrading Existing General Secondary Schools.** An important unplanned activity under the project was the upgrading of 593 existing general secondary schools through the provision of computer labs, science labs, multimedia rooms, and furniture and equipment (including books for school libraries). Although this activity was neither included in the project description nor implied by the PDO, it was expected to make an important contribution to the project's general objective of improved education quality by improving teaching and learning conditions in project schools. A major thrust of the project-supported training was to equip teachers and school managers to use the upgraded facilities and equipment effectively. Although there were no outcome measures of the effect of school upgrading on student learning, there was an output measure in the form of certification of school upgrading to meet the infrastructure standards set by the National Quality Assurance and Accreditation Authority for Education

(NAQAAE). Forty-seven of the 593 upgraded general secondary schools have received this NAQAAE certification.[63] A study conducted in Egypt in 2006 [64] however, raises questions about whether school upgrading did in fact lead to improved student learning. The study examined the effects of several variables, including availability of specialized school facilities on student performance in the national general secondary school certification examination, a uniform standardized exam developed by the Central Directorate for Examinations and administered in all general secondary schools. Using data for all 1,942 public and private general secondary schools in Egypt for the 2002/2003 school year and controlling for other variables, the study looked at the effect on student performance of availability of computer labs, science labs, libraries and other specialized facilities – the same types of facilities which were provided to general secondary schools under the project after the suspension of commercial school conversion. The study found no consistent relationship between variations in school resources and student achievement. Another finding that raises question about the outcome of school upgrading under the project is that the science laboratories which were provided to schools as part of the project-supported upgrading of general secondary schools are underutilized because most students select a humanities specialization rather than a science specialization.[65]

3.3 Efficiency

(Net Present Value/Economic Rate of Return, cost effectiveness, e.g., unit rate norms, least cost, and comparisons; and Financial Rate of Return)

The project is rated as "marginally unsatisfactory" for efficiency, based on the extent to which the project achieved or is expected to achieve expected benefits at least cost compared to alternatives. The reservations described above about the appropriateness of commercial school conversion – by far the largest component of the project – and the research evidence described below suggest that this instrument was not a least-cost approach for bringing about improved opportunity in secondary education. This ICR does not attempt to update the cost-benefit analysis that was provided in the PAD. Because that analysis was based on unsubstantiated assumptions about how enrollments might respond to school upgrading and how school upgrading might affect graduate earnings, it would be pointless to do so.

According to PAD Annex 14 and PAD Annex 1, the employment and earnings outcomes of school conversion were to be evaluated on the basis of tracer studies of the labor-market experiences of graduates of these schools by comparison to those of graduates of control-group schools. Done properly, this analysis would have provided valuable insights on the labor-market outcomes of school conversion and the associated investments in upgraded facilities and teacher competence under the project. Unfortunately, it was not done.

Lacking that information, the most appropriate sources of information on the outcomes of project interventions are indirect. Indirect evidence is available from the recent research literature that can shed light on the labor-market outcomes of the two largest actions

under the project: school conversion (from commercial secondary schools to general secondary schools), and upgrading of general secondary schools:

- **School Conversion.** A recent research paper by staff of the Bank's Cairo office raises further questions about the appropriateness of school conversion under the project. Whereas most earlier studies of labor-market outcomes in Egypt have looked at the returns to education only by level of attainment, the authors of this study use the findings of the 1998 Egyptian Labor Market Survey of 1998 (based on a sample size of 24,000) and of the 2006 Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey (based on a sample size of 37,000) to examine the returns to education for disaggregated categories of labor-market participants, including those who formerly attended general secondary schools and those who formerly attended technical secondary schools. The authors find that the returns to general secondary education in Egypt were higher than the returns to technical secondary education in 1998, but lower than the returns to technical secondary education in 2006.[66] It is particularly significant that the relationship between returns to general and technical education reversed itself between 1998 – ironically, the year of SEEP identification – and 2006 -- the original closing date for the SEEP. What this suggests is that the labor-market advantage brought about by converting commercial schools to general secondary schools under the project is likely to be significantly less than anticipated on the basis of earnings patterns at the time of project identification and appraisal, and could even be negative. This finding raises yet another reservation about the appropriateness of the school conversion component.

- **School Upgrading.** After the Government's decision to suspend conversion of commercial schools to general secondary schools, the remaining funds which had been allocated for school conversion plus unused funds from other components were used to upgrade 593 existing general secondary schools. Although general school upgrading was not explicitly included in the project description and the project's PDO, it was expected that this action would lead to improved quality and opportunity in secondary education, the project's overall objective. As noted above, recent research findings raise questions about whether school upgrading did in fact lead to improved student learning. Reports in the Government's contribution to this ICR of underutilized science laboratories in upgraded schools raise further questions about the efficiency of school upgrading under the project.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating
(combining relevance, achievement of PDOs, and efficiency)

Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory.

The project is rated as "marginally unsatisfactory" for outcomes, based on "marginally unsatisfactory" ratings for relevance, efficacy, and efficiency as explained in Sections 3.1 through 3.3, above.

Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

Rating: Marginally Unsatisfactory.

Relevance of objectives, design, and implementation is rated as "marginally unsatisfactory." Although the overall objective of improved quality and relevance of secondary education was and remains highly relevant to current development priorities and with current Bank country and sectoral assistance strategies,[67] there were significant shortcomings in project design and implementation. As explained above, there are important questions about the appropriateness of school conversion -- the largest component of the project -- as an instrument for improved opportunity. Other shortcoming of project design include the over-ambitiousness of the specific goals for educational change, lack of a satisfactory design for monitoring and evaluation, and the fact that preparation of the school grant activity did not reveal the technical reasons that led to its cancellation. The ICR notes that a QAG[68] review rated the project's quality at entry as "highly satisfactory." The very different rating provided in this ICR is based on the relevance of project objectives, design and implementation as assessed at the time of preparation of this ICR, consistent with OPCS[69] guidelines and based on evidence available in the project file and summarized in Section 3.1 above.

Achievement of PDOs

Rating: Marginally Unsatisfactory

The project is rated as "marginally unsatisfactory" for achievement of project development objectives, based on the extent to which the project objectives were achieved or are expected to be achieved. The project had many positive outputs, including overachievement of its quantitative training target. It also made a major unplanned contribution to upgrading existing secondary schools. But there were, nonetheless, significant shortcomings in achievement of project objectives:

- Only one of its six key project indicators was confirmed as achieved, and that by a combination of actions inside the project and outside the project; one was not achieved; and four were not confirmed as achieved.
- None of the many planned changes in educational programs and governance under the project was actually implemented, with a single exception: incorporation of a performance indicator among the criteria for teacher promotion and selection of school principles. A new curriculum framework was developed and approved, but not implemented.
- Quantitative targets for training were overachieved, but there is no evidence that training led to improved skills or application of those skills to improved teaching and school management.
- There was no tangible progress in other project actions to improve flexibility in secondary education, including development of common core courses, development of specializations and electives, and development of equitable mechanisms to allow students to transfer between streams.

Efficiency

Rating: Marginally Unsatisfactory

The project is rated as marginally unsatisfactory for achievement of objectives at least cost compared to alternatives because of questions about the appropriateness of commercial school conversion as an instrument of improved opportunity (Section 3.1). Research evidence (Section 3.3) also raises questions about whether expenditures for commercial school conversion and general school upgrading under the project in fact led to the expected benefits of improved secondary education quality and opportunity.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts
(if any, where not previously covered or to amplify discussion above)

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

Equity Effects. As described above (Section 1.4), the decision taken during implementation to suspend conversion of commercial schools and to use the remaining proceeds of the school conversion component to upgrade existing general secondary schools added a new category of beneficiaries – students who attend the upgraded (but not converted) general secondary schools. The component as originally designed aimed to convert about 315 commercial schools to general secondary schools. As implemented, it supported the conversion of 205 commercial schools into secondary general schools, plus the upgrading of 593 existing general secondary schools, implying a significantly larger total number of direct beneficiaries under the component. In doing so, however, it may have diluted the activity's equity-enhancing benefit: According to the rationale provided in the PAD, students who historically attended technical secondary schools faced poorer economic opportunities upon graduation. In Egypt, as in most countries with segmented secondary schooling systems, students who attend technical schooling are more likely to be from lower-income households than students who attend general secondary schooling. The school conversion component was originally designed to allow some of these students who would have gone to technical schools in the absence of the school conversion component to improve their options by attending general secondary schools instead. Since the beneficiaries of general-school upgrading were likely to be already-privileged students who were admitted to general secondary schools, the suspension of school conversion may have involved replacement of a small number of lower-income beneficiaries with a larger number of higher-income beneficiaries, thereby diluting the equity-enhancing benefits of the project (Section 3.2). This effect may have been outweighed by the fact that many of the existing secondary schools selected for upgrading under the project were located in relatively low-income areas. In any case, research findings on the lack of significant correlation between upgraded school facilities and student achievement (Section 3.3) suggest that those effects are likely to be modest unless they are accompanied by significant improvements in use of those upgraded facilities. This was a specific objective of the project-supported training.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening
(particularly with reference to impacts on longer-term capacity and institutional development)

In addition to strengthening teaching skills, project-supported training helped strengthen the capacity of education management staff at the central, regional, and local levels, as well as the professional skills of staff at the national agencies for curriculum development and assessment. Recipients have evaluated the training very positively, although its impact on application (Level 3), and outcome (Level 4) of relevant skills has not been assessed.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

As discussed above (Sections 3.3 and 3.5a) the project support for upgrading existing general secondary schools following the suspension of commercial school conversion may or may not have contributed to learning improvement in those schools. Gaps in M&E make this outcome indeterminate.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops
(optional for Core ICR, required for ILI, details in annexes)

The May 2012 stakeholders' consultation and evaluation workshop (Section 3.2 and Annex 6) assessed participants' reported levels of satisfaction with project-provided training and evaluators' observations on the effectiveness of training delivery (including availability of resources, use of teaching strategies, attendance rates etc.) and on interview data from participants, trainers, and others involved on the quality and relevance of program content and the effectiveness of delivery. The workshop involved 72 participants. Most of the participants were from agencies involved in project implementation. Only 19 were teachers or school managers. Seventy-two percent of participants reported that they were satisfied with SEEP's contribution to project objectives. Seventy-four percent of participants rated SEEP's overall performance as "moderately satisfactory." The most revealing findings of the workshop were participants' reports of what they viewed as the project's most significant achievements and expected results that were not achieved. The most frequent responses to those questions are summarized below:

SEEP Achievements	SEEP Disappointments
Development of a new curriculum framework	Non-implementation of new curriculum framework
Effective use of technology in schools	Dilution of educational benefits through private tutoring and other sources of student absences
Upgrading and establishing science and IT labs	Uninspired training delivery
Converting commercial schools into general secondary schools	Insufficient attention to improving teaching methodologies
Upgrading school libraries	Insufficient attention to technology for school management
Training for school librarians	Perpetuation of separate schooling streams rather than moving toward comprehensive secondary schools

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

Rating: High

The overall risk to achieving or sustaining the project development outcome is rated as high because the Government lacks a plan for achieving the key educational outcomes that were sought but not achieved under the project (Section 3.2). There are also other sources of risk to achieving the project's objectives. Public resistance to the conversion of commercial schools to secondary general schools and the Government's reversal of its school conversion policy early in project implementation provides a valuable lesson on the public's sensitivity to some of the changes that the project sought to achieve. Full implementation of the new curriculum framework that was developed under the project, including development of a common core curriculum for 10th grade classes in technical and general secondary schools, could also encounter public resistance when (and if) the Government proceeds with implementation.

Secular and religious interests are in daily conflict in Egypt, reflecting their fundamentally different beliefs and visions for Egypt's future. Because of its role in shaping future generations, education is always a coveted tool of persuasion in such conflicts. It is likely to play the same role in Egypt's current political struggles. Conflicting aspirations of secular interests and religious interests could also affect some of the education reforms that were supported under the SEEP. Curriculum reform, in particular, could be vulnerable to competing political or religious interests, as it is even in the United States. Another risk to implementation of the new curriculum comes from another source: As one of the project supervision missions reported, private tutors resist implementation of the new curriculum because they have vested interests in the current rote-learning-based curriculum.[70]

Another risk element for sustainability of SEEP's development objective is the possibility of underutilization of science and computer laboratory facilities that were supported under the project. The 2012 Stakeholders' Workshop reported that students' preference for non-science specializations leads to underutilization of laboratory facilities in some project schools. Another problem identified in the Stakeholders' Workshop was the problem of student absences due to private tutoring in the final year of secondary schooling. Student absences could also lead to underutilization of the facilities and equipment provided under the school conversion and upgrading component of the project.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

(relating to design, implementation and outcome issues)

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

(i.e., performance through lending phase)

Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

The Bank's performance in ensuring quality at entry is rated as moderately unsatisfactory. The design deficiencies described above (Section 2.1 and 3.1) – including overambitious targets for reform of education programs and processes, the absence of a suitable baseline and monitoring and implementation for evaluation of outcomes, incomplete preparation of the school grant activity, and the questionable rationale and incomplete social analysis for conversion of commercial schools -- the largest component of the project -- reflect significant shortcomings in Bank performance in ensuring quality at entry. These deficiencies contributed to problems during implementation, including the cancellation of the school grant activity and problems in responding to the suspension of commercial school conversion early in implementation.

(b) Quality of Supervision
(including of fiduciary and safeguards policies)

Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

The quality of supervision is rated as moderately unsatisfactory, reflecting significant problems in ensuring effective implementation of the project, particularly during the initial years of project implementation. The first seven years of supervision neglected project actions to improve education quality improvement and monitoring and evaluation, including failure to react to violation of a dated covenant until two year after the date had passed. A revealing example of less-than-diligent supervision during the initial years of project implementation was that the first 14 ISRs repeated verbatim the same summary of issues and actions, including: *"issue – PPMU needs to establish a strong monitoring and evaluation system,"* and *"action – PPMU will establish a monitoring and evaluation system by hiring an expert in monitoring and evaluation."* A serious shortcoming of supervision occurred in 2004, when Bank supervision missions inappropriately agreed, apparently without management consultation, to the Government's suspension of commercial school conversion and its replacement with general school upgrading. It was not until six years after the event that senior management was notified of the change, even then without mention of the fundamental change in project approach that this entailed. On their own, these shortcomings would have justified an "unsatisfactory" rating. But later supervision efforts, particularly after the arrival of a new team leader, new sector manager and new Country Director in 2007, showed a more serious resolve to address the areas neglected during the earlier years of implementation. On their own, these more recent supervision efforts would have merited a "satisfactory" rating. The overall rating for supervision reflects this evolution. Because 75% of project disbursements occurred during the first seven years of implementation, the overall rating is more heavily weighted by the lower rating of early supervision.

Staffing decisions appear to have played a role in the change from initially unsatisfactory supervision to more satisfactory supervision in the later years of project implementation. There were several changes in project supervision responsibility during the thirteen years of implementation. The headquarters-based education specialist that led project appraisal in 1999 was responsible for project supervision for just one and a half years before departing for a new assignment. At that point, just after project effectiveness in June

2000 and the September 2000 project launch mission, responsibility for project supervision was decentralized to the Cairo field office under two successive team leaders, the second of whom was newly recruited from the USAID Cairo field staff. It was under this team leader, who was inexperienced in Bank procedures, that the supervision team agreed to the suspension of school conversion and its replacement with upgrading of existing general secondary schools. Between March 2005 and January 2008, project supervision was managed by a succession of four headquarters-based TTLs. The education specialist who was named as TTL in January 2008 remained as TTL through closing in October 2012, providing the first effective continuity in project supervision under a team leader with the professional qualifications and experience to address the quality issues which by then had become critical.

These changes in staffing are reflected in supervision performance. As noted by the March 2005 Mid-Term Review,[71] progress up to that point was limited largely to hardware procurement (facilities and equipment) under the school conversion component, although – as discussed at length above -- there were important unresolved issues with that component following the suspension of school conversion in 2004. There was very little progress in implementing project activities that were designed to improve education quality, including curriculum reform, teacher training, school grants, and monitoring and evaluation.

One indication of supervision shortcomings during the first five years of implementation was that the first 18 ISRs rated PDO and implementation as "satisfactory", despite: a) the lack of progress on most project activities, including non-compliance with the dated covenant on monitoring and evaluation, b) the suspension of school conversion under the largest component of the project, which called into question the attainment of the general-education enrollment target and led to a disconnect between the PDO and project activities, and c) the fact that slow implementation had already necessitated the first of four closing-date extensions. The lack of progress in monitoring and evaluation was not reflected in a downgraded M&E rating until November 2004, when supervision management was relocated to headquarters-based staff. Shortly thereafter as the request for the first Closing-Date extension was being finalized, the rating for monitoring and evaluation was upgraded to "satisfactory," despite the fact that an evaluation specialist had not yet been recruited to lead implementation of monitoring and evaluation as earlier agreed.[72]

The Mid-Term Review of the project occurred in March 2005, just fifteen months before the initial Closing Date -- far too late to serve its intended purpose of initiating timely corrective action on project issues. The review expressed concern about the lack of progress on actions to improve education quality under the project and the absence of a monitoring and evaluation plan and the staff to implement it. It did not mention the unresolved issues related to the suspension of commercial school conversion and its replacement with general school upgrading.

June 2007 – a year into the first extension of the project -- marked a turning point in project supervision under a new TTL, a new Education Sector Manager, and a new

Country Director. The June 2007 ISR was the first to report the long-standing problems with project implementation – particularly, with the lack of Government action on the common 10th grade curriculum for technical and general secondary schools and the delay in progress on the general education enrollment target following the decision to suspend conversion of commercial schools to general education schools -- and to reflect them in down-graded "marginally satisfactory" ratings for PDO and overall implementation progress. It was also the first time that the management team weighed in seriously and constructively to address implementation problems, and to urge specific corrective action. This new supervision team intervened creatively to bring about progress on the educational change agenda under the project – for example, using Bank budget to hire a consultant to help prepare a new curriculum framework and to organize an evaluation of project-supported training. But there were limits to what these efforts could accomplish in view of the shortcomings of project design and early supervision, the discontinuities arising from continuing changes in ministerial responsibilities, and the political disruptions of the Revolution and its aftermath.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

The overall rating for overall Bank performance is Moderately Unsatisfactory, reflecting the combined result of the ratings for Bank performance in ensuring quality at entry and quality of supervision.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

The rating for Government performance for the project is rated as Moderately Unsatisfactory. As noted above, the thirteen-year implementation period for this project is *ipso facto* evidence of less-than-full diligence in implementation performance by the Government and supervision performance by the Bank. It was not until 2005 – six years into implementation of the project – that the Government appointed a full-time project manager. In addition, several actions by the Government during project implementation – including the delays in implementing the new curriculum framework -- suggest a less-than-full commitment to the objectives of the project, particularly for the quality enhancement and monitoring and evaluation actions under the project.

Project implementation was adversely affected by staffing discontinuities and by lack of team staff with interest and expertise in monitoring and evaluation and in the qualitative dimensions of the project (Section 5). This was true of staffing particularly on the Borrower side, but staffing discontinuities also affected Bank supervision. Frequent changes in Ministers of Education – with six successive Ministers between 2004 and 2012 – led to serious delays and discontinuities. Examples of ministerial decisions that delayed implementation were the replacement of the entire implementation team in March 2010 and the shift of implementation management responsibilities from the PPMU

to the Education Support Fund, and the creation in 2011 of a Ministerial Steering Committee that constituted a further bureaucratic hurdle in project implementation. A particular case of Steering Committee obstruction was its decision to stop implementation of the planned second stage of training for School Board members under the project.[73]

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

The rating for implementing agency performance for the project is rated as "Moderately Unsatisfactory." In addition to the overall unenergetic implementation that necessitated four closing date extensions, this rating is based on the consistent neglect of the quality and evaluation dimensions of the project – including the PPMU's non-responsiveness to efforts by the Bank supervision team after 2007 to motivate more serious attention to the qualitative dimensions of the project and to evaluation of project outcomes. The implementation team at the Education Support Fund worked hard to complete school upgrading and training activities during the final two and a half years of implementation despite an almost-total lack of institutional memory following the 2010 staffing change and shift in responsibilities from the PPMU. Nonetheless, implementation of the qualitative and evaluative dimensions of the project continued to languish right up to project closing. Creative actions by the supervision team, including use of Bank budget to hire consultants for development of the new curriculum framework and for evaluation of project-financed training, helped bring about some progress on lagging activities. But these interventions could not compensate for the lack of educational commitment and expertise on the part of the implementing agency.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

The rating for overall Borrower performance is Moderately Unsatisfactory, based on the ratings and underlying assumptions presented above.

6. Lessons Learned

(both project-specific and of wide general application)

Project objectives should reflect the difficulty of education reform. In this first venture into the secondary education subsector, goals for change in content and processes should have been much more modest. Project teams and sector management need to resist the temptation to try to fix all problems in a single operation – particularly, in a first operation in a subsector.

The Results Framework is critical for aligning project design to desired outcomes. As described above (Section 3.1), the insufficient attention to causal links in developing a justification for the school conversion component led to important questions about the rationale for the largest component of the project. Actual implementation experience strongly suggests that school conversion was not necessary for achieving the reform program objective of increasing the share of secondary enrollments in general education.

This disconnect between interventions and objectives could have been avoided through more meticulous care in developing the results framework for the project.

PDOs and indicators should be clear and consistent throughout project documentation. The errors and inconsistencies in presentation of the PDO and the gaps in performance indicators obscured the links between interventions and objectives in the SEEP, and hindered project implementation. Statements of a project's development objective should be clear, logical, and consistent – ideally, repeated verbatim across project documentation and throughout the course of project implementation. Key performance indicators should reflect all of the main elements of the PDO.

Project restructuring should be timely, and appropriately directed. The 2010 project Restructuring was seriously late in reflecting changing implementation circumstances. Even then it did not address the disconnect between the new activity – upgrading general secondary schools -- and the project description and PDO instruments. The Restructuring was also directed to senior management, without a documented consideration of whether circumstances may have warranted Board approval. In order to be the constructive tool that it is meant to be, project restructuring needs to be timely and appropriately directed.

Effective implementation of monitoring and evaluation may require a new approach. Design of the project seriously neglected outcome evaluation (Sections 2.1, 2.3). Despite this neglect at entry, a number of Bank supervision missions worked with implementing authorities to develop a meaningful evaluation strategy as implementation progressed. But although several evaluation plans were developed through these efforts, the Government failed to implement any of them. The neglect of outcome evaluation in Bank-financed projects is not new. IEG's review of Bank-financed education sector lending over the decade 2110-2010 reported that:

> *As is evident from in-depth analysis of the results of projects that explicitly aimed to improve learning and labor market outcomes, even when programs have been executed well, it has been difficult to assess whether they have had the intended impact because of weaknesses in M&E. The problem starts with conceptual weaknesses in the results framework that should link the activities or policies to intermediate and final outcomes, problems identifying reasonable indicators to measure all parts of the chain for both short- and long-term outcomes, and the failure to track other factors that could positively or negatively affect outcomes. In implementation, there is a strong emphasis on monitoring; evaluation—which would consider the counterfactual—has been greatly neglected.* [Page 55, Independent Evaluation Group, *World Bank Support to Education Since 2001: A Portfolio Note*, December 28, 2010.]

Since impact evaluation generates external benefits for a global audience on what works, but none of the patronage benefits and ribbon-cutting opportunities that civil works and large-scale equipment procurement provide, it is not surprising that implementing agencies rarely take impact evaluation seriously. In view of the global external knowledge benefits of impact evaluation, it would make sense for the Bank or other donors to finance project impact evaluation and to insist on access to the necessary

performance documentation. Another approach would be for the Bank to use whatever leverage is available during project implementation to ensure that outcome evaluation is being taken seriously. Closing date extensions and other amendments offer a particularly good leverage point for motivating better performance on outcome evaluation. With eight project amendments and four closing-date extensions, the SEEP provided ample opportunity for using such leverage to motivate better government performance on evaluation. In at least one case, this was attempted under SEEP implementation, but the effort failed when the supervision team reported that the M&E conditionality was met when in fact progress was not satisfactory. Closing-date extensions should be granted only after the implementing agency has taken corrective action to address the constraints that have delayed project implementation.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners
(a) Borrower/implementing agencies

(b) Cofinanciers

(c) Other partners and stakeholders
(e.g. NGOs/private sector/civil society)

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Components	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
Component 1: Improving Quality and Opportunity	177.7	318.3	179.1
Component 2: Strengthening Institutional Capacity	15.3	1.9	12.4
Total Baseline Cost	192.9	320.2	167.0
Physical Contingencies	19.8	0.00	0.00
Price Contingencies	37.2	0.00	0.00
Total Project Costs	250.0	320.2	128.0
Front-end fee PPF	0.00	0.00	.00
Front-end fee IBRD	0.00	0.00	.00
Total Financing Required	0.00	0.00	

(b) Financing

Source of Funds	Type of Cofinancing	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
Borrower		200.0	242.0	121.0
International Development Association (IDA)		50.0	53.8	107.6

Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Egypt Secondary Education Enhancement Project
Key Performance Indicators[2]

Objective	Key Performance Indicators	Baseline	End of Project	
Project Development Objective	**Outcome/Impact Indicator**		**Target**	**Actual**
Improving Quality and Opportunity of Secondary Education by: a) increasing equality of opportunity in access to general secondary education through flexible options for study within and between branches of the system, b) better aligning curricula and assessment with the skill needs of employers and higher education, and c) providing professional development for teachers on the new curricula and assessment techniques.	Share of general secondary students increases from 30% to 40% by 2010 (revised from…"30% to 50% by 2006").	30%	40%	43.4%[3]
	Curriculum and assessment aligned.	None provided	None specified	Not accomplished.
	Percentage of technical secondary graduates entering higher education rises from 5% to 8%.	5% (asserted but not documented)	8%	Not documented
	Graduates from project schools achieve good pass marks on school leaving exam as compared to non-upgraded schools.	None provided	None specified	Not documented
Strengthening Educational Management. To strengthen the capacity of the education system at the central level and in selected governorates and schools to deliver quality education by: a) better defining	At least 70% of school management teams are judged competent in duties as outlined in new job criteria by 2006.	None provided	70%	New job criteria not developed.

[2] From PAD Annex 1, "Project Design Summary," and 2010 Restructuring Paper, except for first sub-objective, which is from PAD page 2 with the correction described in Section 1.2.

[3] Based on figures provided by the Ministry of Education to the ICR mission. UNESCO enrollment data for 2010 lead to a considerably higher figure of 49.3% (table 3f, UNESCO Institute for Statistics online database), while the 2011 OECD mission reports a lower figure of 38.7%.

responsibilities, b) strengthening accountability mechanisms, and c) providing professional development for school heads and administrators.				

Project Outputs	Output Indicators	Baseline	End of Project	
			Target	Actual
Flexible secondary education provided which maximizes opportunities available to all students.	50% of commercial schools converted to general secondary schools by 2006.	None provided.	None provided.	The 205 commercial schools which were converted to general secondary schools under the project amounted to 28% of the 722 commercial schools in operation in 2001/2001.[4]
A framework of common core courses developed for a comprehensive and unified secondary curriculum consisting of a common core of essential skills and competencies. Specialization requirements for the various branches, and optional subjects within each branch.	New overall curriculum developed by 2000. .	No new curriculum, no core courses.	See preceding.	New framework curriculum developed and approved, but not implemented.
	Core courses developed and instituted by 2003			Core courses not developed. Specialization requirements and optional subjects not developed.
System of student evaluation restructured to: a) validly assess common core courses, b) incorporate a student diagnostic framework based on skills assessment, and c) report students' achievements and abilities in forms more suitable to the requirements of further education and the labor market.	School-level assessments for common core subjects used at the end of first secondary level in all schools by 2005.		See preceding.	No assessments developed. New common core subjects not implemented.
	Profiles of		See	Achievement

[4] Table 2, Annex 2, Ministry of Education, *National Strategic Plan for Pre-University Education Reform in Egypt: Towards an Educational Paradigm Shift, 2007/2008 – 2011/2012, Annexes.*

	achievement in common core courses used in 50 schools to place students in "strengthening" groups by 2006.		preceding.	profiles not developed. "Strengthening" groups not established.
Information and multimedia technology integrated into curriculum, teaching, and learning by: a) integrating computer literacy into the common core courses, b) supporting the provision of teacher resource centers in project schools, and c) promoting the use of technology in teaching.	Computer literacy in first secondary level assessed through a science or social studies project in 315 project schools by 2005.		See preceding.	Assessment not carried out.
	Teacher resource centers in 315 project schools provided with hardware and software by 2005.		See preceding.	205 converted commercial schools and 593 upgraded general schools equipped with computer labs, science labs, multimedia rooms, and libraries.
	At least five teachers in each of the 315 project schools use information technology in teaching by 2005.		See preceding.	Teachers from 205 converted commercial schools and 593 upgraded general schools were trained in use of information technology in teaching, but no assessment carried out on their use of information technology in teaching.
Improved capacities and capabilities of teachers to deliver the secondary teaching and learning reforms.	At least five teachers in each of the 315 project schools use appropriate methodology to teach skills objectives [sic.] in common core courses by 2005.		See preceding.	No assessment carried out.
	In-service training for teachers planned and delivered at the		See preceding.	Overachieved. (See Annex 7.)

	local level by 2005.			
Improved and efficient management structures and practices established at the MOE governorate (*muddiriya*), district (*idara*), and school levels to assure efficient service delivery and adaptability to reforms.	New job descriptions for positions within the inspectorate adopted by 2004.		See preceding.	Not accomplished.
	Ministerial decree setting criteria for promotion by merit published by 2004.		See preceding.	Decree adopted in 2007.
Quality assurance mechanism established linking basic, secondary, and tertiary education to implement a national sector-wide quality framework for accountability and management practices.	National criteria for assessing school effectiveness adopted by 2002.		See preceding.	Not accomplished.
	Instruments for assessing quality of school facilities, management, and teaching validated by 2003.		See preceding.	Not accomplished.
	Senior inspectors in 2-3 selected *muddiriya* trained by 2003.		See preceding.	Accomplished. (See Annex 7.)
	Five schools in each *muddiriya* inspected by trained inspectors using prepared instruments by 2005.		See preceding.	Not accomplished.
School management responsibilities devolved to local levels and relevant responsibilities devolved to governorates and districts within defined parameters.	315 project schools prepare action plans for school improvement with participation of parents' councils.		See preceding.	Not accomplished.

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis

(including assumptions in the analysis)

This ICR does not attempt to update the cost-benefit analysis that was provided in the PAD. Because that analysis was based on unsubstantiated assumptions about how enrollments might respond to school upgrading and how school upgrading might affect graduate earnings, it would be pointless to do so. See Section 3.1 for a description of the deficiencies of cost-benefit analysis for the project, and Section 3.3 for a summary of indirect evidence from the recent research literature on the labor-market outcomes of the two largest actions under the project: school conversion (from commercial secondary schools to general secondary schools), and upgrading of general secondary schools.

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names	Title	Unit	Responsibility/ Specialty
Lending			
Mae Chu Chang	Lead Education Specialist	EASHD	TTL
Supervision/ICR			
Mohamed Yahia Ahmed Said Abd El Karim	Financial Management Specialist	AFTME	FM
Raghada Mohamed Abdel Hamed	Team Assistant	MNCEG	ACS
Suzy Edward Bazerghi	Temporary	MNCEG	
Mona Sabet Zikri	Education Technology Specialist	MNCEG	TTL
Ahmed Mohamed Mahmoud Dewidar	Consultant	MNSHD	
Andrew Burke	Consultant	MNHD	
Marwa El-Mossalamany	Temporary	MNSHD	
Akram Abd El-Aziz Hussein El-Shorbagi	Senior Financial Management Specialist	SARFM	FM
Emma Paulette Etori	Language Program Assistant	MNSHD	ACS
Brigitte S. Franklin	Program Assistant	MNSHD	ACS
Mahmoud Gamal El Din	Senior Operations Officer	MNSHE	Procurement
Sahar Mohamed Hegazy	Program Assistant	MNC03	ACS
Arun R. Joshi	Senior Education Specialist	AFTEE	TTL
Maiada Mahmoud Abdel Fatt Kassem	Finance Officer	CTRLA	FM
Sebastian Martinez	Senior Economist	HDNCE	
Josephine Masanque	Senior Financial Management Specialist	OPSOR	FM
James L. McCloud	Consultant	MNSHD	
Mona Ezzat Abdel Hamid Mostafa	Temporary	MNC03	
David Michael Sprague	Consultant	MNSHD	
Hisham Ahmed Waly	Manager, Financial Management	MNAOS	FM
Christina D. Wright	Operations Officer	MNSHE	
Celine Gavacj	Senior Operations Officer	AFTDE	
Sara Youssif	Temporary	MNC03	
Ernesto P. Cuadra	Lead Education Specialist	MNSHE	TTL
Michel J. Welmond	Lead Education Specialist	CMEIC	TTL
Michael Mertaugh	Consultant	MNSHE	ICR author

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)	
	No. of staff weeks	USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)
Lending		
FY98		44.33
FY99		282.19
FY00	7	4.85
FY01	4	4.90
FY02		4.46
FY03		0.08
FY04		0.00
FY05		0.00
FY06		0.00
FY07		0.00
FY08		0.00
Total:	11	340.81
Supervision/ICR		
FY98		0.00
FY99		22.41
FY00	14	52.27
FY01	22	77.38
FY02	18	57.82
FY03	16	29.50
FY04	18	53.51
FY05	34	109.87
FY06	31	96.10
FY07	32	87.26
FY08	34	104.30
FY09		100.56
FY10		80.99
FY11		139.28
FY12		119.43
FY13		70.08
Total	**219**	**1200.76**

Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results

(if any)

Project-supported training sessions usually concluded with an inquiry into participants' satisfaction with the training that they received. As reported in the Borrower's ICR (Annex 7), training sessions reported a high level of participant satisfaction with training. Apart from this, the only other beneficiary feedback obtained under the project was through the May, 2012 Stakeholder's Workshop, described in Annex 6.

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results
(if any)

Introduction

A Stakeholders' Workshop was held in Cairo on May 8, 2012 to assess stakeholders' views of and reactions to project-supported training. A total of 81 individuals participated in the workshop. The purpose of the Workshop was to collect feedback from stakeholders and project beneficiaries on the achievements of SEEP, relevance of results, and lessons learned.

Methodology

The Workshop was conducted to respond to two major evaluation questions:

- Evaluation Question 1: What is the evaluation of the stakeholders and beneficiaries of SEEP of the project's results? How satisfactory is the project according to their perceptions?
- Evaluation Question 2: What suggestions and recommendations do they have for improving the secondary education sector in Egypt?

Three procedures were used to collect data to respond to the evaluation questions:

1. Survey on Stakeholders and Beneficiaries' Evaluation of Project Results. A survey was designed by the consultant and conducted at the beginning of the Workshop in order to avoid any biases that would have possibly occurred because of presentations on project results. The survey questionnaire, "Stakeholders and Beneficiaries' Assessment of SEEP Results", was designed in English and then translated into Arabic to enhance the validity of the procedure since Arabic is the first language of all of the participants. Back translation was also conducted to ensure equivalence in both languages. The survey was completed by 72 respondents, consisting of teachers, school principals, school inspectors, MOE central and governorate-level officials, and staff of the national curriculum development center (CCIMD) and national examinations center (NCEEE).

2. Presentations on project goals and achievements by the Project Manager and representatives of the key implementation partners, and discussion by Workshop participants.

3. Focused Discussions. After each presentation delivered by MOE and project partners, a focused discussion was conducted to validate the achievements presented.

Findings

Detailed findings are available in the full report of the Stakeholders' Workshop (attached).

Overall findings are summarized as follows: 71% of SEEP stakeholders and beneficiaries were satisfied with the results achieved by SEEP. Participants reported that the most significant accomplishments of the project were:

- the professional development programs provided to teachers, school administrators and non-teaching staff,
- school maintenance and upgrading, and
- the new secondary school curriculum framework.

The most revealing findings of the workshop were participants' reports of what they viewed as the project's most significant achievements and expected results that were not achieved. The most frequent responses to those questions are summarized below:

SEEP Achievements	SEEP Disappointments
Development of a new curriculum framework	Non-implementation of new curriculum framework
Effective use of technology in schools	Dilution of educational benefits through private tutoring and other sources of student absences
Upgrading and establishing science and IT labs	Uninspired training delivery
Converting commercial schools into general secondary schools	Insufficient attention to improving teaching methodologies
Upgrading school libraries	Insufficient attention to technology for school management
Training for school librarians	Perpetuation of separate schooling streams rather than moving toward comprehensive secondary schools

The participants rated the project's overall performance as "Moderately Satisfactory," and recommended further professional development programs for all the human resources involved in secondary education, continuity of support by the World Bank in completing the process of creation of the new secondary education curricula, and enhancement of e-learning at the secondary stage.

Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

The Borrower's draft ICR listed project accomplishments as summarized below, but did not provide performance ratings for the project.

Component 1: Improved Educational Quality and Opportunity

A. Converting commercial schools to general schools.

In collaboration with the General Association for Educational Buildings (GAEB), SEEP achieved the following:

From 2001 to 2005, a total of 205 commercial secondary schools were converted into general secondary schools. The conversion process included rehabilitation and provision of science laboratories, equipment, computers for these labs, multimedia centers for classrooms, libraries and computer laboratories as follows:

- 205 schools were rehabilitated with computer labs, science labs, multimedia rooms and libraries as a preparation for equipment.
- 409 science labs (biology – chemistry – physics) were equipped with furniture, appliances, tools, instruments, chemicals.
- 297 computer labs were equipped with 15 personal computers and a printer per each in addition to furniture.
- 205 multimedia rooms were equipped with a personal computer for each, a television set 29", a video cassette recorder, a receiver, a video projector and a stabilizer in addition to furniture.
- Equipping each school with 2 sorts of applied activities (industrial – agricultural-housekeeping) up to the nature of the school; i.e. gender.
- Equipping each school with 2 fire extinguishers, ceiling fans and curtains as a kind of protection for the computer labs, science labs and multimedia rooms.
- Equipping each school with iron doors and windows to protect the computer labs and multimedia rooms.
- 205 school libraries including furniture, 2 personal computers, a printer, books, dictionaries, references and encyclopedias for each.

B. Upgrading Existing General Secondary Schools

From 2006 to 2008, a total of 584 existing general secondary schools out of 593 targeted schools were selected by GAEB for upgrading in collaboration with the Central Directorate for Secondary Education. GAEB established criteria and standards for the selection of schools such as available spaces for equipping computer labs, science labs or multimedia rooms, number of classes, teachers, administrators, etc. On this basis:

- 307 schools were equipped with a computer lab including 19 personal computers, 3 printers, 24 benches, 48 seats in addition to 5 personal computers for school administration.
- 277 schools were equipped with 5 personal computers for school administration and 3 printers in addition to 5 benches and 5 chairs. Quantities of equipment were reduced for these schools due to either an already adequate supply of equipment or unavailability of space for additional equipment.
- 184 schools were equipped with a multimedia room that includes a personal computer, a video projector, a trolley and a seat.
- 584 school libraries were equipped with furniture.
- 390 school libraries were provided with books, dictionaries, reference books and encyclopedias.

From 2008 to 2010, a total of 85 schools were rehabilitated according to the needs of each school, and 100 schools were equipped with classroom furniture including 20 student benches, 40 student chairs, 1 teacher bench, 1 teacher chair, one white board and one blackboard.

In 2012, 907 secondary schools were equipped with physical education equipment including 4 footballs, 4 basketballs, 4 handballs, 4 volleyballs, and table tennis and a handball net.

C. Training

Staff of the 205 Converted Schools. Training programs were delivered to the teaching staff at the 205 converted schools so as to achieve the objectives of component 1. Training for these schools was as follows:

- 2,918 teachers of commercial subjects were trained on the use of computers	2001 – 2002
- 79,680 teachers were trained on the use of computers (computer literacy)	2002 – 2004
- 2,801 science teachers were trained on the use of the new science labs	2002 – 2006
- 442 teachers of instructional computer were trained on the use of the new computer labs	2005
- 480 school librarians were trained on the E-library	2007
86,321	**Total**

Training took place both centrally and regionally, depending on the nature of the training program and the availability of the training sites.

D. Addressing the Poor Quality and Relevance of Education Courses and Assessment Methods.

New Curriculum Framework. With the assistance of local and international consultants, a new curriculum framework for secondary education was developed. To help with this process, a new framework for all education stages was designed and revised with a special reference to the general secondary stage. Core subject documents were also prepared under the supervision of the Center for Curriculum and Instructional Materials Development (CCIMD) and subject counselors in addition to experts as well as specialists at universities and other stakeholders. Technical assistance was provided to staff of the CCIMD in text books manuscript writing and school textbook design. The MOE has authorized the launching of preparation of new textbooks based on the new curriculum under a competitive process.

Experts and consultants were hired to design instructional materials for in-service training and training programs were delivered to help teachers improve their teaching skills. While awaiting the new curriculum framework, training focused on enhancing teachers' teaching skills and competencies that were aligned with internationally accepted good practices, including active learning, cooperative learning, constructive learning, and comprehensive evaluation, as well as the use of technology in teaching. This was achieved in collaboration with various educational institutions including faculties of education, the Professional Academy for Teachers, the Central Directorate for In-service Training, the General Directorate for Instructional Computer, and the National Center for Educational Evaluation and Examinations (NCEEE). Training activities were delivered to different clusters of teachers whether at the 205 converted schools or the 593 upgraded schools as shown below:

- 640 teachers were trained on the use of technology in teaching	2000 – 2003
- 180 teachers of economics were trained on education economics	2006
- 7646 core subjects teachers were trained on the use of technology in teaching methodology (1st phase)	2008 2009
- 6429 core subjects teachers were trained on the recent trends in teaching methodology (2nd phase)	2009 - 2010
- Additional 33474 teachers subjects teachers were trained on the recent trends in teaching methodology	2011 - 2012
48,369	**Total**

Student Assessment. Egypt's participation in the TIMSS-2007 international student assessment survey was supported by the project, including fees for NCEE staff attendance at meetings and conferences for the survey. The project also supported technical assistance and training for NCEE staff by foreign consultants specialized in item banking and psychometrics.

Component 2: Strengthening Institutional Capacity

Training for School Boards. The Project provided training for School Boards in all governorates. A total of 1,079 School Board members were trained in their new roles and responsibilities. In 2006, due to community feedback, the ministerial decree concerning both the structure of the School boards and their roles and responsibilities was amended. Training materials were modified to reflect that amendment, and the project planned to offer additional training to School Boards on that basis. But the SEEP Steering Committee declined to proceed with this training, arguing that there were other donor agencies working on this topic. Consequently, the money allocated for this activity was reallocated to support school upgrading.

School Grants. The SEEP implementation team found it hard to work on this subcomponent due to the absence of both a realistic vision and a practical mechanism to apply decentralization. During the supervision mission of March 5-19 2005, it was agreed by both the World Bank staff and SEEP implementation team to reallocate the money for this category to school upgrading.

Developing New Quality Assurance Mechanisms and Improving Management Practice.

A number of consultations with stakeholders – including education experts, senior officials from the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Local Development – were held to revise and improve management and personnel practices and introduce performance incentives for teachers and school managers. That process resulted in the issuance and application in 2007 of a new Law, No. 155, for teaching staff. In addition to seniority, the new law adds a performance criterion as a basis for teacher promotion. Moreover, competitions for selecting the best secondary school principals were held by MOE. These competitions were based on specific standards such as the ability to manage secondary schools using modern principles such as authority delegation, crisis management, time management, school self-evaluation, English language proficiency, and proficiency in use of computers in school management.

The project provided computers for the school administration to help with school management. Training programs were delivered to school managers and deputies as shown below:

- 32 secondary school managers were trained on the use of computers	2003
- 120 secondary school managers were trained on school management	2006
- 200 secondary school managers were trained on the use of computers	2008
- 2,287 secondary school managers and deputies were trained on recent trends in secondary school management	2009
- An additional 67,278 secondary school managers and deputies were trained in recent trends in secondary school management	2011 - 2012
69,917	**Total**

Training was also delivered to school supervisors and inspectors to meet project objectives:

- 306 supervisors of instructional computer were trained in the use of the new computer labs	2006
- 4,831 core subjects and activities supervisors were trained in the use of technology in teaching (1st phase)	2009
- 4,260 core subjects and activities supervisors were trained in the new trends of supervision (2nd phase)	2009
9,397	**Total**

The evaluations of this training found that supervisors were pleased to be able to use computers at last and be able to cope with both teachers and students. Activities supervisors were extremely pleased with that kind of training as it was the first time it was provided. Both core subjects and activities supervisors asked for more specialized training programs so that they don't feel isolated in their work.

Building capacity. The project contributed to the improvement of administration and school leadership through the following training actions:

- 184 Members of school-based training and evaluation units were trained on training management and national standards.	2005
- 1,354 MOE quality and monitoring reviewers were trained on quality assurance and accreditation	2008
- 1,921 *mudiriya* and *idara* undersecretaries, managers and deputies were trained on modern educational leadership	2008 - 2009
3,275	**Total**

Those trainees became the main pillars for establishing a quality assurance department at each *idara* nationwide to work on examining the capacities of schools and encourage them to become accredited through the techniques described in NAQAAE's handbooks.

In 2006 and 2007 an E-school training program was delivered for 509 school administrators (2 school administrators per school at the 205 converted schools). Most of the converted schools, where the software of this program was installed, are managing students' affairs and staff affairs using this program.

Technical support was given through funding research in several project areas, including:

- Core subjects at the 10th grade
- Strategies for teaching and educational supervision
- Secondary education in Egypt from 1990–2004
- Utilizing technology in teaching
- Enhancing the role of school based training and valuation units
- Enhancing the role of Boards of Trustees

The project contributed to workshops conducted for the purpose of developing the National Strategic Plan 2007 -2012, with particular attention to secondary education strategy.

The project provided support to a number of educational institutions to help strengthen their capacity:

- 145 out of 286 educational idaras nationwide were provided with a computer lab. Each lab contains 19 personal computers, a printer, a network, 19 benches and 37 seats.
- 8 computer labs were equipped at 7 training sites: 2 at CDIST and 1 at Cairo, Port Said, Kafr El Sheikh, Assuit and Aswan.
- A computer lab and a video projector for the National Center for Educational Researches and Development (NCERD)
- Policy and Strategic Planning Unit at the Ministry was provided with personal computers and printers.
- CCIMD was provided with personal computers and printers to help with school textbook design.
- A computer lab for the General Directorate for Examinations
- A computer lab for the Inspection Department

Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

N.A.

Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

Ahmed Dewidar, "Secondary Education Enhancement Project (SEEP), Report on Stakeholders' Consultation and Evaluation Workshop," consultant report, May, 2012.

Secondary Education Enhancement Project (SEEP)

Report on

Stakeholders Consultation and Evaluation Workshop

May, 2012

Consultant

Dr. Ahmed Dewidar

President

Validity,

Research & Evaluation for Development

adewidar@gmail.com

1. INTRODUCTION & PURPOSE

During SEEP supervision mission from 22 to 27 April 2012, a stakeholders consultation and evaluation workshop was planned as part of the end of project assessment of results that feeds the Implementation Completion Report (ICR). The workshop was conducted on 8 May 2012 and the purpose of this report is to provide a description of the workshop procedures and present findings of the evaluation of stakeholders of SEEP's results and its developmental contributions to the education sector in Egypt.

2. WORKSHOP OBJECTIVES AND PROCESS

The purpose of the workshop was to collect feedback from stakeholders and project beneficiaries on the achievements of SEEP, relevance of results and lessons learned. The target participants of the workshop were:

1. MoE Undersecretary for Secondary Education
2. PAT director and his staff who designed, supervised and managed training provided by SEEP
3. Sample of teachers who benefited from SEEP training with diversity representing different subjects, governorates, rural versus urban areas and gender (Converted Schools should be represented with at least 40% of the sample of teachers)
4. Sample of school directors who benefited from SEEP capacity building (Representing converted schools, upgraded schools and non beneficiary schools from different governorates, gender and rural versus urban areas)
5. Sample of secondary education supervisors who have benefited from SEEP with diversity of representation. Sample should include also supervisors who monitor teaching/learning in schools benefited from SEEP (converted, upgraded and non-upgraded but their teachers were trained by SEEP).
6. Sample of other educational staff such as IT technicians, librarians and social advisors, etc. who benefited from SEEP interventions with diversity of representation
7. A sample of undersecretaries from 3-4 governorates for overall assessment of teachers, supervisors, school managers, GAEB, etc. as a result of SEEP interventions.
8. GAEB staff who worked on SEEP interventions
9. CCIMD staff who have worked on the new curriculum design
10. CCIMD former director, who worked with SEEP for a long term on earlier versions of curriculum design
11. NCEEE who worked with SEEP and benefited from its interventions
12. Sample of trainers, who conducted SEEP training
13. Evaluators who are contracted to conduct level 3, implementation, of

training
14. Current and Former Staff of SEEP
15. Current and former WB staff worked on SEEP
16. A representative from MIC

The project director, Dr. Mohamed Abu Rezka, and his team worked so hard on planning for the workshop and on inviting the target audience. More than a hundred candidate were invited, out of which, 81 attended the workshop. This is considered a very high response rate as the time of the workshop coincides with the end of the academic year examinations. Following is a summary of the workshop events.

1. Opening by Project Manager
2. Survey on the project results
3. Presentation by Project Manager on project achievements & open discussion
4. Presentation by GAEB & open discussion
5. Presentation by PAT & open discussion
6. Presentation by CCIMD & open discussion
7. Wrap up and closure

3. METHODOLOGY

The workshop was conducted to respond to two major evaluation questions:

Evaluation Question 1.	*What is the evaluation of the stakeholders and beneficiaries of SEEP of the projects results? How satisfactory is the project according to their perceptions?*
Evaluation Question 2.	*What suggestions and recommendations do they have for the secondary education sector in Egypt?*

A number of procedures were used to collect data to respond to the evaluation questions. They were as follows.

1. **Survey on Stakeholders and Beneficiaries' Evaluation of Project results.** A survey was designed by the consultant and conducted at the beginning of the workshop in order to avoid any biases that would have possibly occurred because of presentations on project results.
2. Focused Discussions. After each presentation delivered by MoE and project partners, a focused discussion was conducted to validate the achievements presented.

The findings with details relevant to evaluation questions are presented below.

4. FINDINGS

Following are the findings of the quantitative and qualitative analyses of the survey and then a summary of the participants' comments, suggestions and recommendations for future development of secondary education in Egypt.

4.1 Stakeholders and Beneficiaries' Assessment of SEEP Results

The survey was designed in English and then translated into Arabic to enhance the validity of the procedure since Arabic is the first language of all of the participants (Back translation was also conducted to ensure equal forms in both languages). The survey was completed by 72 respondents whose affiliations are described in table 1.

Table 1. Respondents to Survey on Assessment of SEEP Results by Affiliation

Affiliation	Number of Participants
CCIMD	9
FOA	7
GAEB	3
IT for Education	4
MIC	2
NCEEE	1
NCERD	4
NTS	3
PAT (Head & Director of Training)	2
School Management	7
Senior Administrator (MoE & Governorates)	9
Supervisors	9
Teachers	12
Grand Total	**72**

The survey consisted of 5 questions:

1. The participants were required to rate 16 statements on a 4 point scale (4=strongly agree, 3=agree, 2=disagree and 1=strongly disagree) and indicate that they do not have enough info to respond to a particular statement by selecting NOT Applicable (NA). The statements were designed according to the objectives of SEEP.
2. Participants were required to rate the project on a 6 point scale ranging from Highly Satisfactory = 6 to Highly Unsatisfactory = 1, which is the same scale used in the ICR.
3. The participants were asked to list the most significant results of SEEP.
4. The participants were asked to list what did not work for SEEP and why they think so.
5. Participants were asked to provide their comments, suggestions and recommendations for SEEP and the development of secondary education in Egypt.

The English version of the survey can be found in Annex 1, page 10.

4.1.1 Achievement of SEEP Objectives

Table 2 shows the participants' mean scores on each of the statements and the overall assessment of SEEP results. One reverse item was used to check for the reliability of the responses provided by each individual (item 13 was the reverse of item 5). The table shows mean scores for "all cases" (n=72) and "most reliable" subgroup (n=49).

Table 2. Mean Scores of Participants' Assessment of SEEP Achievements

Most Reliable		All Cases		Statement	No.
%	Mean	%	Mean		
77%	3.07	**79%**	3.16	The objectives of SEEP were clear to me.	1
62%	2.47	**66%**	2.65	I believe the conversion of commercial schools into general schools by SEEP was a positive step for secondary education reform in Egypt.	2
59%	2.34	**65%**	2.61	The commercial schools converted into general schools have been providing good quality general secondary education.	3
74%	2.97	**74%**	2.96	SEEP has contributed significantly to the new curriculum framework for secondary education in Egypt.	4
72%	2.87	**74%**	2.96	The professional development programs provided by SEEP were relevant to the development needs of secondary education in Egypt.	5
71%	2.83	**70%**	2.81	SEEP has contributed significantly to the development of more valid and reliable assessments in secondary education in Egypt.	6
78%	3.11	**81%**	3.25	SEEP has contributed significantly to effective use of ICT in secondary education.	7
74%	2.97	**75%**	2.98	The professional development programs SEEP provided were with high quality.	8
72%	2.90	**74%**	2.94	The performance of teachers who received SEEP professional development programs improved because of such programs.	9
71%	2.84	**74%**	2.96	SEEP contributed to effective school management through the professional development programs provided to school administration.	10

Most Reliable		All Cases		Statement	No.
%	Mean	%	Mean		
69%	2.74	**58%**	2.34	The performance of supervisors who received SEEP professional development programs improved because of such programs.	11
79%	3.14	**80%**	3.18	SEEP contributed significantly to upgrading secondary schools in Egypt	12
68%	2.74	**61%**	2.44	*The professional development programs provided by SEEP were relevant to the participants' needs	13
77%	3.08	**78%**	3.12	SEEP has significantly supported secondary schools to meet the requirements for accreditation	14
66%	2.64	**69%**	2.75	SEEP provided successful professional development programs to non teaching staff in secondary education schools in Egypt (Librarians, Social Specialists, ICT, etc.)	15
72%	2.86	**75%**	2.98	Overall, I am satisfied with the results SEEP has achieved.	16
71%	**2.85**	**72%**	**2.88**	**Overall**	

*Reverse item of #5. It was corrected to average it with the rest of the items for overall mean.

Figure 2 shows a comparison of all participants' mean scores (n=72) and the most reliable subgroup (n=49). It can be seen that there are no significant differences between both. In 75% of the items (n=12), the mean scores of the most reliable subgroup were less than the whole group and in 25% (4 items), they were equal or higher. This shows that there is a relatively high overall level of reliability of the ratings of the participants even when the responses of some of the participants were less in reliability (n=23).

Figure 2. Comparison between "All Cases" and "Most Reliable" Subgroup Mean Scores



	i1	i2	i3	i4	i5	i6	i7	i8	i9	i10	i11	i12	i13	i14	i15	i16
All Data	79%	66%	65%	74%	74%	70%	81%	75%	74%	74%	58%	80%	61%	78%	69%	75%
Reliable Data	77%	62%	59%	74%	72%	71%	78%	74%	72%	71%	69%	79%	68%	77%	66%	72%

The above findings were interpreted according to the following scale.

3.60-4.00 = Highly Satisfied (90%-100%)
2.60-3.50 = Satisfied (65%-89%)
1.60-2.50 = Dissatisfied (40%-64%)
1.00-1.50 = Strongly Dissatisfied (25%-49%)

It is noteworthy that the mean scores of the "Most Reliable" subgroup are used for the following interpretations.

- No items received "High Satisfaction" from the participants.
- They participants were "satisfied" with SEEP results in terms of
  - SEEP's significant contribution to upgrading secondary schools in Egypt
  - SEEP's significant contribution to effective use of ICT in secondary education.
  - Clarity of project objectives
  - SEEP's significant support to secondary schools to meet the requirements for accreditation
  - SEEP significant contribution to the new curriculum for secondary education in Egypt
  - The quality of the professional development programs provided by the project
  - The relevance of the professional development programs provided by project to the development needs of secondary education in Egypt
  - The improvement in teachers' performance because of the professional development programs provided by the project

- SEEP's significant contribution to the development of more valid and reliable assessments at secondary education in Egypt
- SEEP's significant contribution to effective school management through the professional development programs provided to school administration
- The improvement of supervisors' performance because of the professional development programs provided by the project.
- SEEP's effective professional development programs provided to non teaching staff (Librarians, Social Specialists, ICT, etc.)

- The participants were dissatisfied with
  - the conversion of commercial schools into general schools
  - the quality of general secondary education provided by the converted schools
- No items received strong dissatisfaction from the participants.

The overall satisfaction level of the participants was 2.85/4.00, 71%, which was "*Satisfied*". To demonstrate the reliability of the findings, item 16 which describes the overall satisfaction of the participants received a mean score of 2.86/4.00, 72%, which is almost identical to the average of all items (2.85, 71%).

4.1.2 Participants' Rating of SEEP Overall Performance

Table 3 shows the frequency of ratings of project overall performance by the participants on the 6 point scale that matches the World Bank scale.

Table 3. Participants' Ratings of SEEP Overall Performance

Rating	Descriptor	Frequency	Overall Score
1	Highly Unsatisfactory	0	**4.42/6.00** **74%** **Moderately Satisfactory**
2	Unsatisfactory	4	
3	Moderately Unsatisfactory	3	
4	Moderately Satisfactory	22	
5	Satisfactory	24	
6	Highly Satisfactory	6	
NA	Not Enough Info to Evaluate	11	
Blank	-	2	
Grand Total		**72**	

59 of the participants rated the project overall performance, while 11 indicated that they do not have enough information to assess the project and 2 left this section blank. The mean score rating the project performance was 4.42 (74%), which is **"Moderately Satisfactory"**. It is noteworthy that the rating almost matches the satisfaction level of the participants (71%).

4.1.3 Most Significant Achievements of SEEP

Table 4 shows the most significant results achieved by SEEP according to the participants and the frequency of each as listed by them.

Table 4. Most Significant Results Achieved by SEEP by Frequency

No.	Significant Results	Frequency
1.	Professional Development programs for Teachers, Supervisors and School administration, etc.	31
2.	Upgrading and Maintenance of Schools	23

Table 4. Most Significant Results Achieved by SEEP by Frequency (Cont.)

No.	Significant Results	Frequency
3.	The new Curricula Framework	14
4.	Effective use of technology in schools	11
5.	Upgrading and establishing science and IT labs	10
6.	Converting commercial schools into general secondary schools	6
7.	Upgrading school libraries	2
8.	Professional development for librarians	2
9.	Establishing activity rooms	1

According to the participants, the most significant results achieved by SEEP were the professional development programs provided by the project, the upgrading and maintenance of schools and the new curricula framework.

4.1.4 Expected Results that were Not Achieved

Table 5 shows the expected results by the participants that were not achieved by SEEP and their frequencies. It is noteworthy that the implementation of the new curricula was not an objective of SEEP nor was the project aiming at establishing new schools.

Table 5. Participants' Expected Results that were not Achieved by SEEP by Frequency

No.	Expected Results that were NOT achieved	Frequency
1.	Implementation of New Curricula	3
2.	No real change took place at the student and teacher levels because of the deficiencies in the secondary stage itself through private tutoring and absence of students	3
3.	Professional development programs were conducted in a traditional format and did not reach many. More effective programs were expected.	2
4.	New and modern methodologies for teachers were needed.	2
5.	More use of technology in school management was needed	2
6.	The project should have established "Comprehensive Schools" that include general, technical and vocational education	1
7.	Completion of infrastructure in all secondary schools	1

8.	The project should have been more "visible"	1
9.	More attention should have been given to areas of specialization during training. Not one size fits all!	1
10.	More attention should have been given to non-curricular activities	1

4.1.5 Participants' Comments, Suggestions and Recommendations

Table 6 shows the comments, suggestions and recommendations made by the participants and their frequencies. While SEEP has contributed significantly to the professional development of teaching and nonteaching staff, the need for more is still very strong as indicated by the participants' most frequent recommendation (almost 40% of all comments made). The second most frequent recommendation was to continue to support and supervise the process of the development of the new curricula followed by enhancing e-learning opportunities at the secondary stage.

Table 6. Participants' Comments, Suggestions and Recommendations

No.	Comments, Suggestions and Recommendations	Frequency
1.	Professional development programs are still needed for all involved in the education process (Teaching, Admin & Non Teaching Staff)	16
2.	The project should continue supervising the process of development of the new curricula until the end	3
3.	More e-learning should be developed at the secondary stage	3
4.	School maintenance should happen according to plans for school development not according to contractors' views	1
5.	Application of "quality" measures through good governance	1
6.	New methodologies in Assessment should be implemented	1
7.	Use of technology in school management: " e-management"	2
8.	More responsiveness in requests of support from the project (Speed & Quality)	1
9.	Transfer at least 30% of the students' assessments into electronic assessments	1
10.	A reform project for technical education	1
11.	Linking secondary education to labor market needs	1
12.	Secondary students' participation in community development	1
13.	The new curricula should promote talents and innovations	1
14.	More focus should be given to the graduates of the faculties of education to prepare them well for the classroom	1
15.	Projects need to be monitored more effectively	1
16.	The project should have been evaluated by a neutral body	1
17.	Follow up on the implementation of training	1
18.	There should be one entity responsible for managing education projects with staff competent to successfully implement the project	1
19.	More support to non-curricular activities	1
20.	Attention should be given to education media	1
21.	Attention should also be given to primary, prep and technical schools	1

4.2 Focused Discussions of Project Partners' Presentations on Project Achievements

As described earlier, 4 presentations were delivered during the workshop (Project Management, GAEB, PAT and CCIMD) followed by discussions on the content presented in each. Following is a summary of the observations and main points of discussion.

- A database of all secondary schools should be created. Short and long term development plans should be designed according to priorities.
- A chronic problem with non-curricular activities is that equipment is stored and never used to protect it from damage. The end result is that no activities are

conducted and the equipment becomes obsolete not to mention the waste of resources buying the equipment in the first place.

- More than half of the Egyptian population lives in rural areas; however, the secondary education schools in rural areas are very much less in quality than urban areas in all aspects: the building, the teachers and the learning resources.
- There is a need for real cooperation between the professors at the faculties of education and the education directorates.
- While there is considerable focus on science labs, most of the students avoid the scientific section and join the literary one. In some schools, the number of scientific section students does not exceed 10% of the total number, while the rest are in the literary section (90%). This is a serious problem that needs to researched and solved.
- Most of the schools lack the "safety" requirements needed for accreditation.
- Cancellation of buying music equipment because of its being expensive is not a good excuse.
- PAT has 15 branches in governorates and is looking forward to opening new ones to cover all 26 governorates to better serve teachers.
- The process for designing and implementing training should to be revisited according to well-defined standards.
- The curricula issue is a highly significant and sensitive issue in Egyptian education. Once the presentation on the new curricula framework was completed, the participants gave so many comments being unfamiliar with a "curricula framework" since this is the first time Egypt has one. Upon clarification of the definition of a curricula framework, and explanation that it will be shared with all stakeholders in the Egyptian society for discussion and refinement, the participants showed appreciation of what has been achieved up to that point.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The following conclusions can be made in light of the data collected in response to the evaluation questions.

SEEP stakeholders and beneficiaries were satisfied with the results achieved by SEEP (2.85/4.00, 71%). The most significant results of the project were

- The professional development programs provided to teachers, school administration and non teaching staff
- The school maintenance and upgrading
- The new secondary school curricula framework

The participants rated the project overall performance as **"Moderately Satisfactory"** with a score of 4.42 out of 6.00 (74%).

The participants recommended more professional development programs for all the human resources involved in the secondary education, continuity of support by the World Bank in completing the process of creation of the new secondary education curricula and enhancement of e-learning at the secondary stage.

Overall, the stakeholders' consultation and evaluation workshop was very successful and provided insights on the achievements of SEEP.

END OF EVALUATION REPORT

[1] Pre-university education in Egypt consists of six years of primary education, three years of preparatory education, and three years of secondary education (either technical or general). School attendance is compulsory only in the primary and preparatory cycles.
[2] Manos Antoninis, "The Vocational School Fallacy Revisited: Technical Secondary Schools in Egypt", Working Paper, Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy, 2001.
[3] "Egypt, Review of Technical and Vocational Education," DFID and World Bank, December, 2003 Page 5 in Alan Abrahart.
[4] *Report of the Employment, Education and Training Foundation* (2001), as reported in Abrahart, *ibid*, page 5.
[5] The figures reported for general secondary and technical secondary enrollments in the first of the tables in PAD Annex 13 imply that 33.6% of secondary enrollments are in general schools and 66.4% in technical schools. The enrollment shares reported in the second table of Annex 13 are consistent with these figures: the "% distribution" row at the bottom of that table reports secondary enrollment shares of 34% general and 66% technical. But there is a problem with the actual enrollment figures in that table. The figure provided for technical secondary enrollments is 124,000 higher than in the preceding table, implying slightly different enrollment shares (32.2% general and 67.8% technical). Moreover, the figures for general and technical secondary enrollments are not at all consistent with the reported figure for "total secondary students" in that table. General and technical secondary enrollments are reported as 908,493 and 1,917,277, respectively, while total secondary enrollments are shown as 5,069,454. The latter figure is evidently an error, and may represent a combined total of preparatory and secondary enrollments. UNESCO's Institute for Statistics reports total secondary enrollments in all programs, public and private, as 3,248,278 in 2000, the earliest year in that series (online database table 3f). The reference year for the enrollment figures provided in PAD Annex 13 is not identified, but is presumably 1998/1999.
[6] Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey, 1998, as reported in Ragui Assad, "Labor Supply, Employment and Unemployment in the Egyptian Economy, 1988-2008," Working Paper No 0701, Economic Research Forum for the Arab Countries, Iran, and Turkey, September, 2007.
[7] Described in the PAD, Annex 16.
[8] PAD, page 14.
[9] In particular, USAID was supporting an extensive program of assistance for improvements in primary and preparatory education at the time of SEEP's preparation.
[10] United States Agency for International Development
[11] The EEP project was originally scheduled to close in December, 2002. After several extensions, it closed in August, 2006.
[12] PAD, page 26.
[13] PAD page 2.
[14] Restructuring Paper on a Proposed Project Restructuring of Secondary Education Enhancement Project, Credit 3194-EG (Board Date: April 15, 1999) to the Arab Republic of Egypt, June 10, 2010.
[15] PAD page 2 and page 26.
[16] Restructuring Paper, page 2.
[17] PAD, pp 8 and 9.
[18] PAD, Page 6 and Annex 2.
[19] Development Credit Agreement, Schedule 2.
[20] *SEEP Development Credit Agreement*, Schedule 2, Part B.1.
[21] Aide Mémoire of October/November 2003 supervision mission, page 5.
[22] Aide Mémoire of March/April, 2009 supervision mission, and Ministry of Education, *Strategic Plan, 2007/2008-2011/2012*, 2007, Annex 2, page 102.
[23] ISR number 14, archived November 8, 2004.
[24] February 22, 2006 letter from Ministry of International Cooperation to Country Director.
[25] Involving approval by the Regional Vice President.
[26] March 26, 2003 letter from Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Bank Country Director.
[27] March 21, 2006 letter from World Bank Country Director to Minister of International Cooperation.

[28] *SEEP Development Credit Agreement*, Schedule 2, Part B.1
[29] June 29, 2008 letter from Country Director to Minister of International Cooperation. (This disbursement schedule is reproduced verbatim from Attachment 2 to that letter. No explanation is provided there for the discrepancies between the figures in columns 3 and 5, and between the figures in columns 4 and 6.)
[30] December 31, 2008 letter from Country Director to Minister of International Cooperation.
[31] *Restructuring Paper on a Proposed Project Restructuring of Secondary Enhancement Project to the Arab Republic of Egypt*, *June 16, 2010*, and June 29, 2010 letter from Country Director to Minister of International Cooperation.
[32] *Restructuring Paper on a Proposed Project Restructuring of Secondary Enhancement Project to the Arab Republic of* Egypt, April 17, 2012, and April 17, 2012 letter from Country Director to Minister of International Cooperation.
[33] July 3, 2012 letter from Country Director to Minister of Planning and International Cooperation.
[34] November 19, 2012 letter from Country Director to Minister of Planning and International Cooperation.
[35] Middleton, John; Ziderman, Adrian; Van Adams, Arvil. 1993. *Skills for Productivity : Vocational Education and Training in Developing Countries*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1993/06/437284/skills-productivity-vocational-education-training-developing-countries.
[36] Aide Mémoire of the November 2007 SEEP supervision mission.
[37] ISR number 10, archived October 25, 2002.
[38] It was an oversight of management review that this statement was retained in the final version of the PAD because preparation should have been completed and this statement should have been revised in the Board package to state that a baseline survey had been carried out as a basis for evaluating project outcomes.
[39] This statement incorporates the revision to correct the error described in Section 1.2.
[40] ISR number 15, archived April 26, 2005.
[41] PAD, page 80.
[42] PAD, page 10.
[43] Development Credit Agreement, Schedule 4.
[44] Ahmed Dewidar, Secondary Education Enhancement Project (SEEP) Report on Stakeholders Consultation and Evaluation Workshop, May 2012. (See Annex 6.)
[45] ISR number 15, archived April 26, 2005.
[46] ISR number 15, archived April 26, 2005.
[47] Page 4, October 2005 SEEP Mission Aide Mémoire and ISR number 16, archived December 1, 2005.
[48] Independent Evaluation Group, *World Bank Support to Education Since 2001: A Portfolio Note*, December 28, 2010.
[49] The rationale which is presented in the PAD for supporting a change in the composition of secondary enrollments starts with several assertions: *"Secondary education in Egypt is divided into a two-track system which provides neither a good general education, nor technical skills relevant to the marketplace….As Egypt becomes increasingly integrated into the international economy through the free trade agreement with the European Union and other initiatives, pressure on its labor force to become internationally competitive is increasing." "The Government has chosen to increase the number of general schools with provision for movement between technical and general schools to provide greater educational opportunities for the majority of students." "There is limited access to general secondary schools. Students need to be able to choose from a variety of learning experiences during and after secondary level. Increasing the share of general schools, as well as the quality of education in all schools, is intended to address this issue."*
[50] Section B.3 of the PAD on "Sector issues to be addressed by the project and strategic choices" would have been an appropriate place for this discussion, but no such discussion of alternative approaches for meeting the Reform Program target for technical/general secondary enrollment composition is presented in this section or elsewhere in the PAD.
[51] page 17 and Annex 4.
[52] PAD, page 11.
[53] PAD, page 17.

[54] It is an established principle of World Bank lending that Bank-financed projects should not replace actions that would have taken place in the absence of Bank financing.
[55] Egypt participated in the TIMSS 8th grade math test in 2003 and 2007, but not in 2011. It has not participated in either of the other two prominent international student assessments : the OECD's PISA, and PIRLS. Egypt scored in the 22nd percentile in the TIMSS 8th-grade math test in 2003 and in the 23rd percentile in the 2007 8th-grade science test. Girls scored 17 points higher than boys in both tests, unlike the pattern among most participating Arab countries.
[56] Other sources report different figures: UNESCO enrollment data for 2010 imply a considerably higher figure of 49.3% (table 3f, UNESCO Institute for Statistics online database), while a 2011 MOE draft report prepared for the OECD reports a lower figure of 38.7% (Table 10, MOE, "Pre-University Education System in Egypt. Background Report, 2011"). Enrollment data as published by Egypt's official state statistics agency, the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), do not distinguish between general secondary and technical secondary enrollments. Repeated requests by the ICR team to CAPMAS for a customized tabulation of general secondary and technical secondary enrollments at project closing went unanswered.
[57] According to the June, 2010 Restructuring Paper, the project was to develop a new instrument to assess management competencies.
[58] But see the discussion of alternative enrollment coverage estimates in endnote 60.
[59] First bulleted instrument in the PDO, PAD page 2.
[60] PAD Annex 1.
[61] Borrower's draft ICR.
[62] A widely-used classification of levels of evaluation of training effectiveness distinguishes four levels of evaluation, as summarized in the text. (See Donald L. and James D. Kirkpatrick, *Evaluating Training Programs,* 3rd edition, 2006.)
[63] Section 4.2, Government draft ICR.
[64] Iman Fouad Shafik Shafik, "School Resources and the Quality of Education," International Institute for Education Planning, Paris, June, 2006.
[65] Government's draft ICR, Section 6. In some of the project-upgraded schools, 90% of students are enrolled in a humanities specialization, and only 10% in sciences.
[66] Page 13, Santiago Herrera and Karim Badr, "Why Does the Productivity of Education Vary Across Individuals in Egypt? Firm Size, Gender, and Access to Technology as Sources of Heterogeneity in Returns to Education," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5740, July, 2011, Middle East and North Africa Region, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit. It would be inappropriate to conclude from Herrera and Badr's finding that *all* graduates of general secondary schools in Egypt experience lower earnings than graduates of technical schools, since most graduates of general secondary schools go on to higher education, which presumably yields significantly higher returns than either stream of secondary education. (The conventional rate of return to secondary education tends to understate the true rate of return because it reflects only the earnings of students whose highest level of educational attainment is secondary education. It thus excludes the typically higher earnings of secondary graduates who progress to higher levels of education.)
[67] Independent Evaluation Group, *World Bank Support to Education Since 2001: A Portfolio Note*, December 28, 2010.
[68] Quality Assurance Group
[69] Operations Policy and Country Services, "Implementation Completion and Results Report Guidelines, August, 2006.
[70] ISR number 14, archived November 8, 2004.
[71] March, 2005. See ISR number 15, archived April 26, 2005.
[72] All subsequent ISRs reported the dated covenant on monitoring and evaluation as "complied with", although at best it should have been reported as complied with delays."
[73] See Government draft ICR, Annex 7.

ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT

- CITIES AND TOWNS
- GOVERNORATE CAPITALS
- NATIONAL CAPITAL
- RIVERS
- MAIN ROADS
- RAILROADS
- GOVERNORATE BOUNDARIES
- INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES

GOVERNORATES IN NILE DELTA:

1 KAFR EL SHEIKH
2 DAMIETTA
3 PORT SAID
4 ALEXANDRIA
5 BEHEIRA
6 GHARBIYA
7 DAGAHLIYA
8 MENOUFIYA
9 SHARGIYAH
10 QALIUBIYA
11 ISMAILIA
12 CAIRO
13 GIZA

Mediterranean Sea
Libyan Plateau
Qattara Depression
Western Desert
Libyan Desert
Eastern Desert
Gulf of Suez
Gulf of Aqaba
Red Sea
Nile River
Lake Nasser
Aswan Dam
WEST BANK AND GAZA
ISRAEL
JORDAN
SAUDI ARABIA
LIBYA
SUDAN
NORTHERN SINAI
SOUTHERN SINAI
SUEZ
CAIRO
GIZA
HELWAN
EL FAYOUM
BENI SUEF
MARSA MATRUH
AL MINYA
ASSIUT
SOHAG
QENA
LUXOR
ASWAN
AL BAHR AL AHMAR
AL WADI AL JADID
To Darnah
To Jalu
To Tel Aviv
To Dongola
To Berber
To Port Sudan
Salûm
Marsa Matruh
Siwa
Qârâ
Alexandria
Damanhur
Kafr el Sheikh
Damietta
Port Said
El'Arish
El Mansura
Tanta
Zagazig
Ismailia
Shibin el Kom
Benha
Giza
Suez
Helwan
El Fayoum
Beni Suef
Taba
Abu Zenima
Ras Ghârib
El Tur
Al Minya
Assiut
Al Ghurdaqah
Bîr Seiyâla
Sohag
Qena
Quseir
Luxor
Mût
El-Kharga
Marsa 'Alam
Kom Ombo
Aswan
Halaib
25°E
30°E
35°E
30°N
25°N
20°N
0 50 100 150 200 Kilometers
0 50 100 150 Miles

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